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1811 
The Independent Board as Shield 
Gregory H. Shill* 
Abstract 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty bars CEOs and other executives 
from managing companies for personal gain. In the modern 
public corporation, this restriction is reinforced by a pair of 
institutions: the independent board of directors and the business 
judgment rule. In isolation, each structure arguably promotes 
manager fidelity to shareholder interests—but together, they 
enable manager prioritization. This marks a particularly 
striking turn for the independent board. Its origin story and 
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raison d’être lie in protecting shareholders from opportunism by 
managers, but it functions as a shield for managers instead. 
Numerous defects in the design and practice of the 
independent board inhibit its ability to curb managerial excess. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the context of transactions 
that enrich the CEO. When executive compensation and similar 
matters are approved by independent directors, they take on a 
new quality: they become insulated by the business judgment 
rule. This rule is commonly justified as giving legal effect to the 
comparative advantage of businesspeople in their domain—in 
determining the price of a product, for example—and it 
immunizes such decisions from court challenge. But independent 
directors can opt to extend the rule’s protection beyond this 
narrow class of duty of care cases to domains that squarely 
implicate the duty of loyalty. The result is a shield for conflicts 
of interest that defeats the major objective of the independent 
board and important goals of corporate law more generally. 
This Article proposes to eliminate the independent board’s 
paradoxical shield quality by ending business judgment 
protection for claims implicating the duty of loyalty. Judges 
would apply the familiar entire fairness standard instead. The 
clearest rationale for this reform comes from the logic of the rule 
itself: comparative advantage. Judges, not businesspeople, are 
best situated to adjudicate conflicts of interest. More broadly, the 
Article’s analysis suggests that the pro-shareholder reputation of 
the independent board is overstated and may have inadvertently 
fostered a sense of complacency around board power.  
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I.  Introduction 
The business judgment rule places management decisions 
that implicate the duty of care, such as salary levels for the 
rank-and-file, all but beyond the review of courts.1 The theory 
 
 1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as 
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.  REV. 83, 87 (2004) (“On the one hand, the 
duty of care requires that directors exercise reasonable care in making 
corporate decisions. On the other hand, the business judgment rule mandates 
that courts defer to the board of directors’ judgment absent highly unusual 
exceptions.”). 
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underlying this policy is that businesspeople and the market are 
better able to decide these questions.2 In the age of independent 
board governance, however, the scope of deference to board 
discretion no longer tracks this logic of comparative advantage.3 
Instead, decisions by management that implicate questions of 
loyalty—such as whether to cut the CEO a $100 million bonus 
check—can be placed beyond judicial review, too, simply by dint 
of having been approved by directors who claim nominal 
independence from the corporation.4 This change has allowed 
CEOs and directors to shield transactions benefiting themselves 
and each other from shareholders, courts, and market 
discipline.5 
The independent board of directors was a well-intentioned 
response to the special problems of the modern public 
corporation.6 In the early days of the New Deal, William O. 
Douglas—then a professor at Yale Law School, later the 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court—developed a set of 
proposals designed “to afford additional protection against the 
evils of the last decade”7 that brought the country to the brink 
of economic ruin.8 In 1934, Douglas published a theory of 
corporate self-monitorship that would eventually become the 
independent board.9 This invention responded to a problem 
 
 2. See id. at 117–18 (explaining the common rationale for the business 
judgment rule which suggests that business experts may know business better 
than judges). 
 3. See infra Part IV. 
 4. See Leo E. Strine Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role 
of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 691 (2010) (discussing the 
resulting duty and accountability issues created as board compositions become 
increasingly independent). 
 5. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
1305, 1307 (1934). 
 8. See EDWIN P. HOYT, WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS: A BIOGRAPHY 40–41, 48, 69 
(1979) (detailing Douglas’ employment at Yale, the SEC, and as an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court). 
 9. See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century 
Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 63, 103–05 (2009) 
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identified by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means two years earlier: 
shareholders in the modern corporation, who were remote from 
corporate operations and beset by collective action problems, 
struggled to effectively monitor managers.10 
This situation left public companies effectively captive to 
the CEO and other insiders,11 who could, in countless lawful 
ways, benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders.12 The 
proposed change gathered strength over the decades, gained 
crucial intellectual support in the 1970s,13 and became 
increasingly common in the late twentieth century.14 In 1993, 
Stephen Bainbridge observed that “virtually all subsequent 
corporate law scholarship has focused on the extent to which 
corporate law ought to prevent management” from abusing its 
control of the corporation.15 Early in the new millennium, U.S. 
stock exchanges codified what had become market practice by 
 
(discussing Douglas’ 1934 article, Directors Who Do Not Direct, and its 
influence on the evolution of corporate boards). 
 10. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION] (“The separation of ownership from control 
produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager 
may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly 
operated to limit the use of power disappear.”). N.B. Berle was a onetime 
faculty colleague of Douglas’. See Jessica Wang, Neo-Brandeisianism and the 
New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, and the Problem of 
Corporate Finance in the 1930s, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2010) 
(discussing Berle’s and Douglas’ tenure at Columbia University). 
 11. Except where noted, this Article will use the terms managers, 
insiders, and executives interchangeably. All refer to top officers who are 
responsible for management of the corporation. 
 12. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI 
Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1034 (1993) 
(“Because no single shareholder owns enough stock to affect corporate 
decisionmaking, the firm is effectively controlled by its managers. Unchecked, 
management may abuse its control by benefiting itself at the expense of the 
shareholder-owners.”). 
 13. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 162–70 (1976) (promoting a monitoring 
conception of the board). 
 14. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in 
the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
 15. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1034. 
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requiring listed companies16 to appoint boards consisting of a 
majority of independent directors.17 
Debates over the independent board have become proxy 
fights over a central question in corporate law: whether 
corporate power should favor shareholders or managers.18 Some 
commentators favor giving managers a wide berth and leaving 
discipline to the market,19 while others see an independent 
 
 16. The terms “listed companies” and “public companies” will be used 
interchangeably to refer to companies that are subject to listing requirements 
imposed by stock exchanges. While the term “public companies” technically 
also includes companies whose stock is traded over the counter rather than on 
an exchange, these companies are generally much smaller and are not subject 
to stock exchange rules, and thus no such meaning is intended in this Article. 
See, e.g., Public Company, NASDAQ, https://perma.cc/U6TT-B64M (defining a 
public company as “[a] company that has held an initial public offering and 
whose shares are traded on a stock exchange or in the over-the-counter 
market”). 
 17. The independent board mandate went into effect in 2003. See Listed 
Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., 
https://perma.cc/PT36-E4VR (setting forth a requirement that New York 
Stock Exchange-listed companies have boards composed of a majority of 
independent directors); Rulebook—The Nasdaq Stock Market, NASDAQ, https://
perma.cc/7LAW-RXUT [hereinafter Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules] (“A majority of 
the board of directors must be comprised of Independent Directors.”). Some 
exceptions exist, discussed at Part II.B, infra. 
 18. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A 
Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474 (2014); see also Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1034 
(observing that “[v]irtually all” corporate law scholarship since Berle and 
Means “has focused on the extent to which corporate law ought to prevent 
management from” abusing its control). 
 19. For expressions of this view generally, see, for example, Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 551 (2003) (discussing the role of the market in 
disciplining boards); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case 
Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 659–60 (2010) 
(observing that the role of the manager is better suited than that of the 
shareholder to maximize the value of the corporation); Martin Lipton & 
William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 734 
(2007) (arguing that a director-centered approach maximizes value and 
benefits the economy); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1069 (commenting on the 
conflict managers in buyout transactions face between maximizing firm rather 
than individual wealth); see also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About 
Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006) (taking issue 
with “the characterization of shareholders as having interests that are 
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board elected by shareholders as a key internal counterweight 
to managers.20 But this difference in philosophy, while 
conspicuous, masks a deeper consensus: neither perspective 
acknowledges—much less endeavors to address— the shield 
problem.21 
The supposedly “dueling ideological mythologists” who 
represent the two schools take as their point of departure, as 
Douglas did, that the independence model in fact operates as a 
 
fundamentally in harmony with one another”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal 
at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 773 
(2006) (proposing that the U.S. corporate law structure creates significant 
accountability issues through director primacy). A different view that likewise 
de-emphasizes shareholder power and would prioritize instead a wider swath 
of stakeholder interests, including not only managers, directors, and 
shareholders, but also employees, communities, creditors, and other outsiders 
to the corporate structure, can be found in the work of Margaret Blair and 
the late Lynn Stout. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: 
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE 
PUBLIC 105– 06 (2012) (maintaining that the popular aim of only maximizing 
shareholder value is misplaced and is detrimental to the economy); Lynn A. 
Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 
808– 09 (2007) (discussing the potential danger to stakeholders that could 
result from ceding power from managers to shareholders); Margaret M. Blair 
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
247, 315–16 (1999) (“[When] directors are limited in their ability to use their 
positions to benefit themselves, they may instead choose to use their positions 
to benefit others by promoting the joint welfare of all the stakeholders who 
together comprise the corporation.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 851 (2005) (“[S]hareholders should have the 
power, subject to certain procedural requirements, to initiate and adopt 
rules-of-the-game decisions to amend the charter or to reincorporate in 
another state.”); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 
242–43 (2002); Ronald L. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We 
Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 507 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1479–80 (1989); 
EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 172–73. For a discussion of the role of “voice” in 
the governance of organizations, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30–43 
(1970). 
 21. See infra Parts IV–V. 
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check on managers.22 In some ways, it does.23 But the 
independent board also magnifies the power of managers, the 
very group whose behavior it was created to constrain.24 The 
emphasis on shareholder interests has yielded an unduly 
narrow understanding of independence.25 Much like the fable of 
the blind men and the elephant, each of whom touch a separate 
part of the animal’s body and describe its appearance 
differently, “touching” the interests of management adds 
important new information to the understanding of the board.26 
When combined with the business judgment rule, the 
benefits the independent board offers to managers are 
extraordinary.27 Independent director approvals confer business 
judgment immunity, which exempts directors and officers from 
liability for business decisions so long as certain low-cost 
procedures are followed.28 The joint product of the independent 
board and the business judgment rule accomplishes a melding 
of the independence quality of the former with the insulation 
effects of the latter, producing a fortified shield.29 This casts 
decisions around conflicts of interest as essentially questions for 
the market rather than legal regulation, which is difficult to 
square with principles of corporate and fiduciary law.30 
The supercharged nature of the business judgment rule in 
the independence era is underappreciated, even by critics of the 
rule. Mark Roe, for example, has described the business 
judgment rule as ensuring “realistically, no liability at all for 
 
 22. Strine, supra note 18, at 474. Strine served as Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court from 2014–2019. Delaware Chief Justice Leo E. 
Strine, Jr. to Retire from Delaware Supreme Court, GOV’T OF DEL. (July 8, 
2019), https://perma.cc/FM64-29H3. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 559 (“[T]he vast majority of 
corporate decisions are made by the board of directors alone, or by managers 
acting under delegated authority from the board of directors.”). 
 25. See infra Parts II–V. 
 26. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. See infra Part IV. 
 30. See generally Andrew Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No 
Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (2019). 
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mistakes, absent fraud or conflict of interest.”31 While this 
protection is “nearly insurmountable,” Roe notes, boards 
disqualify themselves from receiving it if they engage in “fraud 
or conflict of interest.”32 While correct as a statement of black 
letter law, this statement does not capture the ease with which 
conflicts can be cleansed in the era of the independent board.33 
Creative and well-advised boards can sidestep this limitation 
and shield their conflicts through a single additional step: by 
securing the approval of a majority-independent board or 
committee.34 Recent data suggests they do in fact take this step 
regularly with regard to self-dealing transactions, for reasons 
relating to federal securities laws as well as state law.35 
Notwithstanding their titular role, “independent” directors 
are often loath or unable to contradict management due to 
widely acknowledged structural limitations or behavioral 
biases.36 Accordingly, managers have little to fear in seeking the 
blessing of independent directors and much to gain.37 In 
particular, managers can enlarge the universe of decisions 
eligible for business judgment rule immunity.38 
Upon approval of the relevant assemblage of independent 
directors, attacks on the way managers and boards handle 
self-interested transactions of paramount concern to them are 
rendered practically inert as a matter of law.39 These decisions 
are in areas such as executive compensation, takeover bids 
(which threaten to result in the ouster of incumbent managers 
and directors), and shareholder lawsuits against managers and 
directors in their personal capacities. The relative ease of 
 
 31. Roe, supra note 20, at 242 (citations omitted). 
 32. Id. at 243 (emphasis added). 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. See Tuch, supra note 30, at 943. 
 35. See id. at 973–74 (sampling and analyzing public company 
disclosures). 
 36. These limitations include the decision to appoint a given independent 
director; determination of her compensation; the decision to reappoint her; and 
subtler forms of influence, such as recommending her for appointment to other 
boards. See infra Part III.  
 37. See infra Part III. 
 38. See infra Part IV.B. 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
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securing independent approval in effect provides managers with 
a vehicle to leverage corporate assets for their highest personal 
priorities without effective oversight.40 There are 
counterexamples, of course. Delaware courts have imposed 
increasingly complex requirements on management buyouts 
(MBOs), for instance.41 Yet these challenges can be neutralized 
with additional process, the keys to which are held by managers 
(or in the case of MBOs, controlling shareholders).42 
The shield quality of the independent board destabilizes the 
assumptions behind shareholder and director primacy alike. In 
important ways, the independent board continues to serve its 
advertised purpose of empowering shareholders.43 But given its 
interaction with the business judgment rule, its presumed 
function as a one-way ratchet that only favors shareholders 
warrants reconsideration. Given how much corporate law turns 
on the assumption of a unidirectional independent board, cracks 
in that assumption have potentially destabilizing implications 
purely as a legal matter. But the independent board and its 
shield function are not merely legal devices; they are market 
mechanisms with a reach that extends across the public capital 
markets.44 
The independence model and the shield it enables 
empowers managers beyond the realm of law.45 Most 
importantly, it enhances the ability of managers and boards to 
evade market discipline and capture rents from inefficiencies in 
market structure and the independent board itself.46 Even 
sophisticated investors like mutual funds and hedge fund 
activists cannot effectively monitor the governance of the many 
 
 40. See infra Part IV. 
 41. See, e.g., infra Part IV.C.4; John P. Stigi II & John M. Landry, 
Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Management Buyout Merger Price as Best 
Evidence of Fair Value in Appraisal Proceeding, NAT’L L. REV. (June 9, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/SV29-F24C (describing the heightened standard of review 
adopted by a Delaware court in an MBO). 
 42. See infra Part IV. 
 43. See infra Part II. 
 44. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 45. See infra Part V. 
 46. See infra Part V. 
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thousands of publicly traded U.S. companies.47 Proxy advisors, 
whose business is to advise investors on corporate governance, 
operate under scarce resources and intensifying regulatory 
pressure.48 Because “independentness” is universally theorized 
as a shareholder-friendly quality, enhancing the independent 
character of a board is a way for managers to inexpensively 
signal their fidelity to that norm and thus reduce pressure from 
proxy advisors, mutual funds, and activist shareholders in the 
ongoing negotiation of corporate governance.49 
This Article proceeds in six additional parts. Part II 
overviews the foundation of the independent board and its legal 
commands. Part III presents limitations on the efficacy of 
independent directors, and contends that in combination they 
allow managers to take advantage of the structure’s power to 
immunize self-interested decisions. Part IV highlights the 
crucial domains where the independent board, in concert with 
the business judgment rule, furnishes a shield-like immunity to 
managerial conduct. Part V contends that the shield effect is 
even more consequential than a purely legal analysis would 
suggest, because it exploits the limitations of market 
participants, such as institutional investors, that are believed to 
serve a monitoring function. Part VI develops normative 
conclusions and proposals respecting the foregoing. Chief among 
these is that courts should not deem self-interested transactions 
to be cleansed by the approval of independents. They should 
instead be reviewed under a standard with a long history in 
corporate law, the entire fairness standard.50 This would 
 
 47. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory 
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. 
REV. 1861, 1865 (1995) (stating that managers can take advantage of the 
dispersed ownership structure of the corporation to take action without owner 
monitoring). 
 48. See Katanga Johnson & Jessica DiNapoli, U.S. SEC Proposes Rules 
that Could Limit Shareholder Voices, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2019, 10:10 AM), 
https://perma.cc/F87C-WATN (describing new SEC rules that could shift 
corporate power towards management). 
 49. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 50. See generally Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in 
Delaware M&A Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161 (2019) (describing the 
entire fairness standard in Delaware law as review “for objective fairness of 
both price and process”). 
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constitute a partial rejection of internal self-regulation as a 
substitute for external regulation, and as such has implications 
for that common practice in corporate and securities law 
doctrine and institutions more broadly. In Part VII, the Article 
concludes. 
II.  The Constitution of the Independent Board 
In the early part of the twentieth century, changes in 
technology and communication helped drive a great dispersion 
in the ownership of public company equities.51 Coordination 
problems emerged among the numerous shareholders of the 
Berle and Means corporation.52 This yielded a form of 
managerial governance53 that was relatively insensitive to 
shareholder preferences. Thus, managers could pursue projects 
that enhanced their reputations or otherwise served their 
personal goals at the expense of the enterprise without fear of 
consequence from shareholders. In the new ownership54 
 
 51. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 4–5 (3d ed. 2015). 
 52. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 10, at 
47– 68 (documenting the increasingly dispersed ownership of contemporary 
public corporations). These problems predated the arrival of the independent 
board, but continued afterwards. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Board 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW. 351, 354–55 (2019); Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 331 (1976) 
(discussing issues arising from diffuse and detached shareholder ownership).  
 53. See EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 139–41 (contending that the typical 
board was passive and its functions manager-dominated). 
 54. Some critics question whether shareholders truly “own” the 
corporation. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests 
in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 
94 (2003) (“[T]he shareholder as owner, principal-agent model is a flawed 
model as applied to the modern public company.”); Blair & Stout, supra note 
19, at 260–61 (“If ‘control’ is the economically important feature of ‘ownership,’ 
then to build a theory of corporations on the premise that ownership (and, 
hence, control) lies with shareholders grossly mischaracterizes the legal 
realities of most public corporations.”); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1052 
n.104 (contending that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than an 
entity that is owned by shareholders). This Article does not take up this 
distinction, which does not bear on its analysis. To the extent independent 
boards shield managers inappropriately, they are counterproductive from a 
stakeholder perspective as well as an ownership one. 
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pattern, where shareholders stood little chance of influencing 
managerial performance,55 shareholders were said to exhibit 
“rational apathy” towards governance.56 The resulting power 
vacuum left managers more dominant and potentially less 
accountable to shareholders, who were the principals of the 
corporation in which managers served as agents.57 Efforts to 
address this form of agency costs—the gap between shareholder 
and manager interests—have dominated corporate governance 
scholarship for the better part of a century.58 
Control of the corporation is delegated by statute to a 
central board of directors, to which the corporation’s managerial 
leadership is formally subordinate.59 In Berle and Means’ time, 
this operated as a distinction without a difference; boards were 
run by top managers.60 Beginning in the 1970s, academics and 
the market began coalescing around a solution that borrowed 
from Douglas’ proposal during the New Deal: directors who were 
independent of managers and elected by—and thus accountable 
to—shareholders would be better able to supervise managers.61 
In the original model, it was virtually impossible for dispersed 
shareholders to influence the outcome of corporate elections, 
thus leaving the shareholder “‘practically reduced to the 
alternative of not voting at all or else of handing over his vote’ 
to the proxy committee, appointed by existing management, 
 
 55. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 354 (listing defining features 
of the “Board 2.0” model). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Principal-agent is the dominant but not unanimous framework for 
understanding the shareholder-manager relationship. But see Blair & Stout, 
supra note 19, at 315–16 (advancing a theory that disputes the sufficiency of 
agency as an analogy). Disputes over the meaning of “ownership” in the firm 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 58. See supra Part I; infra Part II.A. 
 59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (providing for management by 
a board of directors, except under certain circumstances); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). 
 60. See generally BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 
10, at 220–46 (discussing the legal position of management and of control). 
 61. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 103–07 (describing Douglas’ impact on 
the evolution of the independent board). 
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who can ‘virtually dictate their own successors.’”62 The new 
model, which Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon call “Board 2.0,” 
promised to empower and engage shareholders by enabling 
them to directly elect directors to the board who would take 
their authority over managers more seriously.63 It was regarded 
as a “necessary complement to widely distributed ownership.”64 
This shift,65 which did not fully accomplish its goals, 
nevertheless marked an evolution in the function of the board 
from the Board 1.0 advisory body to the board as supervisor.66 
A.  Background and Theory of the Independent Board 
To understand the perversity of the independent board 
shielding what amounts essentially to executive self-dealing (a 
category this Article defines somewhat more expansively than 
the literature currently does),67 it is instructive to examine 
briefly the aspirations and theory of the independent model.68 
Douglas endorsed the Berle and Means analysis and advocated 
 
 62. Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 
31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 91 (2017) (quoting BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION, supra note 10, at 87). 
 63. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 354. 
 64. Id.  
 65. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1472–73 (“One of the most important 
empirical developments in U.S. corporate governance over the past half 
century has been the shift in board composition away from insiders (and 
affiliated directors) toward independent directors.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 351–56 (“By the end of 
the period, most large public companies had an audit committee, a 
compensation committee, and some version of a nominating-governance 
committee that addressed the performance of the board itself.”). Stephen 
Bainbridge and Todd Henderson have suggested outsourcing various 
functions as a solution to a lack of board skill or subject matter expertise in 
areas of need. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON, 
OUTSOURCING THE BOARD: HOW BOARD SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN IMPROVE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 90–91 (2018) (introducing the concept of the 
specialty board services provider). 
 67. See infra Part IV. 
 68. Space limitations preclude a full recounting of the independent 
board’s history and the reasons for its rise here. One treatment can be found 
in Gordon, supra note 14, at 1472–76 (documenting the shift in board 
composition in the latter half of the twentieth century). 
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a solution that would later become the independent board.69 
Directors, he wrote, lacked the authority to perform a 
supervisory role effectively.70 To change this, he believed they 
“should have a position of dominance and power on the board 
rather than the subordinate position . . . [including] real power 
over the executive management,” with the goal of “taking the 
control or dominance of the board away from the executive 
management.”71 Although it would take decades to become 
orthodoxy, this solution was offered almost immediately 
following the Berle and Means diagnosis.72 
The independent board model gathered steam beginning in 
the middle of the twentieth century,73 particularly in the 
1970s.74 By 2005, “the composition of large public company 
boards dramatically shifted towards independent directors,” 
from roughly 20 percent independents in 1950 to 75 percent.75 
At the committee level, certain committees began to be 
 
 69. See Douglas, supra note 7, at 1305–07 (advancing proposals to reform 
corporate governance, drawing in part on the work of Berle and Means). 
 70. See id. at 1313–14 (describing some shortcomings of insider directors, 
including that “boards wholly or dominantly filled with ‘shirtsleeve’ directors 
drawn from the executive management, without outside representation, are 
apt to suffer from myopia and lack of perspective.”). 
 71. Id. at 1314 (emphasis added). 
 72. It was less than two years after the Berle and Means book was 
published that Douglas endorsed its analysis and advocated a solution that 
would later become the independent board. See id. at 1314 (proposing that 
taking control of the board by executive management would resolve some 
problems of power); HOYT, supra note 8, at 40–41, 69 (discussing Douglas’ 
position as a Yale professor and his appointment to the Supreme Court). 
Before Douglas moved to Yale, he and Berle were colleagues at Columbia. See 
Wang, supra note 10, at 1223. 
 73. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1510–15 (tracing the rise of the 
corporate board model). 
 74. Leading intellectual contributions in this era include EISENBERG, 
supra note 13 and Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52. 
 75. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1465. For example, “the number of 
manufacturing companies having a majority of nonemployee directors 
increased from 63% in 1966, to 71% in 1972, to 86% in 1989,” though not all 
nonemployee directors meet requirements of independence. Bainbridge, supra 
note 12, at 1066–67 n.161 (citing THE CONFERENCE BOARD, MEMBERSHIP AND 
ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATE BOARDS 8 (1990)). 
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constituted exclusively of independent directors.76 Later, the 
audit,77 compensation,78 and nominating and governance 
committees79 were required to be so constituted, and a majority 
of the directors of the board as a whole were required to be 
independent.80 Such directors are not employees of the 
corporation and lack certain other connections to it. This rule 
was instituted following high-profile accounting scandals at 
Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen in the early 2000s, and 
became effective in 2003.81 
 
 76. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(e)(1)(B) (stating 
the requirement that nominating committees be fully independent). 
 77. See infra Part II.B; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 302, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). 
 78. See infra Part II.B; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 24 Stat. 1367, 1900 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C.  § 78j-3). 
 79. See infra Part II.B; Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04(a) 
Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://
perma.cc/LV4W-K7XQ (requiring that nominating and corporate governance 
committees be composed exclusively of independent directors); Nasdaq Stock 
Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(e) (same). 
 80. See infra Part II.B; Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent 
Directors, supra note 17 (requiring that boards consist of a majority of 
independent directors); Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(b)(1) 
(same). The requirement of a majority-independent board applies to publicly 
traded companies in the United States, with a significant exception: controlled 
companies, which are defined in this context as entities in which more than 
50 percent of the voting power is held by an individual, a group, or another 
company. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, N.Y. STOCK 
EXCH., https://perma.cc/AWE3-972G (describing the applicability of the rules); 
Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5615(c) (noting the exemptions for 
controlled companies). There are somewhat different definitions of controlled 
companies in other sources for other purposes, for example Delaware law, but 
however defined they account for a growing share of public companies and 
market value. See IRRC INSTITUTE, CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD 
AND POOR’S 1500: A FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE AND RISK 23 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/MAJ7-7A66 (PDF) (concluding that “the number of controlled 
companies in the S&P 1500 index increased by 16.7 percent between 2005 and 
2015” using an ISS controlled company definition). 
 81. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, supra 
note 17; Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(b)(1). 
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Initially proposed by prominent New Dealers as a 
complement to a never-realized federal incorporation statute,82 
the independent board ultimately gained traction as a form of 
self-regulation that substituted for deeper external oversight, 
both judicial and regulatory.83 The structural implications of 
this shift have not gone unnoticed.84 Lisa Fairfax argues 
persuasively that in cases of potential conflicts of interest, 
“reliance on independent directors has been inappropriately 
used to substitute for rigorous external regulation.”85 Urska 
Velikonja calls them “a poor substitute for public-regarding 
regulation of negative externalities,” and notes that they have 
“pass[ed] as a substitute” nonetheless because they constitute a 
palatable political compromise.86 
The promise of an independent board has been that it could 
stand in for shareholders, mitigating the agency costs intrinsic 
in separating ownership from control87 by monitoring 
managers.88 It is now the terrain on which great battles of 
corporate governance are fought, including over executive 
compensation levels, activist shareholder campaigns, proxy 
 
 82. Berle had drafted a federal incorporation bill, but it was never 
enacted. See Robert B. Thompson, Adolf Berle During the New Deal: The Brain 
Truster as an Intellectual Jobber, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663, 671 (2019) 
(describing Berle’s interest in, and efforts towards, implementing a federal 
incorporation bill). 
 83. Previous commentators have emphasized the inadequacy of 
independence as a substitute for regulation to achieve public ends. See, e.g., 
Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L. 
REV. 855, 894 (2014); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 
96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 131 (2010) (“[T]he installation of independent directors 
serves as a substitute for external regulation, particularly with respect to ‘high 
risk’ transactions.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 83, at 894. 
 85. Fairfax, supra note 83, at 193. 
 86. See Velikonja, supra note 83, at 894 (contending that the 
independence mandate should be abolished). 
 87. This theory was further developed in Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
52. Though Berle and Means did not use the term agency costs, they are 
credited with framing the debate over problems stemming from the separation 
of ownership and control. 
 88. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Independent Director Model 
Broken?, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 791 (2014) (describing the potential of the 
independent board to monitor insider behavior). 
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fights, and contests for control.89 It formally intermediates not 
only the relationship of managers and investors (including 
activist and institutional investors) to the firm, but the position 
of outsiders, e.g., creditors and potential acquirers.90 
Yet even for the subset of corporate decisions over which 
boards have say, CEOs and other top managers exercise 
powerful influence over their boards and can often secure 
approval for dubious priorities. Such moves may be excessively 
aggressive, but CEOs may also be excessively reticent to pursue 
needed changes relative to shareholder preferences.91 Either 
way, core attributes of the independent board bias it towards 
enabling rather than checking manager preferences. The 
independent board thus compounds the agency costs problem at 
the very level (the board) where it was meant to address it;92 it 
also adds a new one, at the level of the market.93 
B.  The Law of the Independent Board 
The independent board structure vests in a board 
something virtually unique among regulated entities: the 
authority to exempt its members from judicial, regulatory, and 
shareholder scrutiny in its principal spheres of action94 —and 
especially the ones most likely to pose conflicts of interest for 
CEOs and other insiders. Approval of a business decision by a 
majority of independent directors activates this exemption by 
triggering the business judgment rule. The details of the 
independent board are thus critical. 
The legal regulation and definition of the independent 
corporate board resides in three sources: state law, federal 
 
 89. Companies that have a controlling shareholder are an exception. See 
infra Parts II–III. 
 90. See Karmel, supra note 88, at 791 (“[T]he independent director no 
longer seems to be acting on behalf of the shareholders as a check on 
management, but rather, is acting to insure the quality of the corporation’s 
product ratings.”). 
 91. See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 104, 122 (discussing versions of this risk). 
 92. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 93. See infra Part V.  
 94. Of course, many provisions of law, such as workplace and 
environmental regulation, are unaffected by board action. 
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securities law, and stock exchanges’ regulations. An overview of 
the legal standards underlying independence helps reveal the 
gap between the aspiration and operation of the independent 
board. 
1.  State Law 
State law is a leading source of law regulating the 
independent board, and Delaware and its corporate law statute, 
the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), are 
preeminent among sources of state law.95 Delaware law does not 
require that companies adopt an independent board model.96 
However, it encourages independent boards through the 
creation of de facto safe harbors for decisions rendered by 
independent boards or committees.97 It further regulates the 
content of independence by making business judgment 
deference conditional on the satisfaction of certain criteria.98 
 
 95. For a variety of reasons, most large public companies are 
incorporated in Delaware. See About the Division of Corporations, DEL. DIV. 
CORPS., https://perma.cc/PZ2M-A3KH (stating that “[m]ore than 66% of the 
Fortune 500” are incorporated in Delaware); Brian J. Broughman & Darian 
M. Ibrahim, Delaware’s Familiarity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273, 289–90 (2015) 
(citing the DGCL’s “merits and predictability” and Delaware’s “substantial 
case law, the flexibility of that law, and the expertise of the Delaware 
Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court to hand down new decisions” 
as reasons corporations choose Delaware). Because of the internal affairs 
doctrine, this also means that a large share of shareholder litigation arises 
under Delaware law in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which is an expert in 
such matters. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 
A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005) (characterizing the internal affairs doctrine as “a 
long-standing choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state 
should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—the 
state of incorporation”). 
 96. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (stating requirements for corporate 
boards under Delaware law); About the Division of Corporations, supra note 
95 (“The Delaware General Corporation Law is the most advanced and flexible 
business formation statute in the nation.”).  
 97. See Broughman & Ibrahim, supra note 95, at 281 (“[W]idespread 
investor and lawyer familiarity with Delaware law has an independent effect 
on choice of domicile apart from any network benefits associated with 
Delaware incorporation.”).  
 98. See id. at 288 (incorporating in Delaware would allow corporations 
access to more case law, better legal services, and advantages of drafting 
efficiencies from past use of Delaware law).   
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Delaware law authorizes the board to immunize interested 
and executive directors from conflict transactions via a 
cleansing vote of an appropriate faction of disinterested, 
independent directors.99 Depending on circumstances, the 
approval necessary might be by a majority of all independents, 
a majority of the full board (when the board is itself 
majority-independent), or a committee constituted only of 
independent directors.100 Crucially, directors deemed 
independent by the board enjoy a presumption of independence 
unless there exist “such facts as would demonstrate that 
through personal or other relationships the directors are 
beholden to [a] controlling person.”101 
The independence inquiry is meant to ensure that “a 
director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject 
before the board rather than extraneous considerations or 
influences.”102 Boards may debate policy amongst themselves, 
seek outside advice, and outsource some functions,103 but “the 
end result, nonetheless, must be that each director has brought 
 
 99. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2020); see infra Part IV.C.5 (noting a 
larger discussion in the literature on the effect of a § 144 approval). 
 100. See infra Part IV; see also In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 
501 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 
635 (Del. 2014) (“[T]he procedural protections employed [must] qualify to be 
given cleansing credit under the business judgment rule. For example, if the 
[corporation’s] special committee was not comprised of directors who qualify 
as independent under our law, the defendants would not be entitled to 
summary judgment under their own argument.”); Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 
44 J. CORP. L. 515, 552 (2019) (noting Delaware courts use intermediate 
standards of review for specific, recurring, and readily identifiable situations 
that can subtly undermine the decisions of independent and disinterested 
directors). 
 101. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (discussing 
independence in the context of a derivative suit demand). A more recent 
formulation explains beholdenness in the following way: an independent 
director must not be “sufficiently loyal to, beholden to, or otherwise influenced 
by an interested party to undermine the director’s ability to judge the matter 
on its merits.” Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding, No. 12108–VCL, 
2017 WL 1437308, at *26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017). 
 102. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. 
 103. See BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 66, at 5 (“Outsourcing 
happens when other business entities can do the work at lower total cost for a 
given quality.”). 
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his or her own informed business judgment to bear with 
specificity upon the corporate merits of the issues without 
regard for or succumbing to influences which convert an 
otherwise valid business decision into a faithless act.”104 At the 
pleading stage, it is enough for a plaintiff to marshal 
particularized facts that support “an inference that [a director] 
‘would be more willing to risk . . . her reputation than risk the 
relationship with the interested person.’”105 
Delaware law’s regulation of director independence 
eschews bright-line rules in favor of contextual inquiry. This 
approach is meant to account for the behavioral dynamics of 
board politics and professional networks. While a Vice 
Chancellor on the Delaware Court of Chancery, Leo Strine 
expanded on this duality: 
[C]orporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply 
enmeshed in social institutions. Such institutions have 
norms, expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, influence 
and channel the behavior of those who participate in their 
operation. Some things are “just not done,” or only at a cost, 
which might not be so severe as a loss of position, but may 
involve a loss of standing in the institution . . . [C]orporate 
directors are [not], as a general matter, persons of unusual 
social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions that 
social norms generate for ordinary folk.106 
 
The decision made clear that the relevant inquiry is not a 
narrow one of whether a director feels the tug of favoritism 
towards the executive in question.107 Rather, the question is 
 
 104. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (emphasis added). 
 105. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 
1381331, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 
1040, 1052 (Del. 2004)). 
 106. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
This case is unrelated to the Oracle decision from 2018. 
 107. See id. at 943  
I do not infer that Grundfest would be less likely to recommend suit 
against Boskin than someone without [close] ties. Human nature 
being what it is, it is entirely possible that Grundfest would in fact 
be tougher on Boskin than he would on someone with whom he did 
not have such connections.  
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whether personal ties and other affiliations were of such a 
character—i.e., close enough—that it was hard for the director 
to assess conduct neutrally, “without pondering his own 
association with [the executive] and their mutual affiliations.”108 
Put another way, a court will deny a director independent status 
where a plaintiff pleads facts showing that “the director in 
question’s material ties to the person whose proposal or actions 
she is evaluating are sufficiently substantial that she cannot 
objectively fulfill her fiduciary duties.”109 
In recent years, Delaware courts have made clear that the 
nature of a disqualifying connection need not be financial or 
familial and can be more generically personal. While the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated in a decision regarding Martha 
Stewart’s company in 2004 that “[a]llegations of mere personal 
friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing 
alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a 
director’s independence,”110 language in more recent decisions 
clarifies that the burden on plaintiffs is more permissive. In the 
MFW111 case, for example, the Chancery Court (per 
then-Chancellor Strine) observed: 
[I]t is sometimes blithely written that “mere allegations of 
personal friendship” do not cut it. More properly, this 
statement would read “mere allegations of mere friendship” 
do not qualify. If the friendship was one where the parties 
had served as each other’s maids of honor, had been each 
other’s college roommates, shared a beach house with their 
families each summer for a decade, and are as thick as blood 
relations, that context would be different from parties who 
occasionally had dinner over the years, go to some of the 
 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 509. 
 110. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004) (emphasis added); 
see Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (describing lack of 
independence in the demand futility context as the presence of “a material 
financial or familial interest”). 
 111. 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013).   
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same parties and gatherings annually, and call themselves 
“friends.”112 
Undoubtedly the clear-in-principle, porous-in-fact distinction 
the court drew between friends (acceptable) and close friends 
(questionable) was intended to account for the reality, 
acknowledged by Strine a decade earlier in Oracle,113 that 
outside directors occupy the same small circles as the executives 
they are supposedly monitoring.114 Relationships within those 
circles “can give rise to human motivations compromising the 
participants’ ability to act impartially toward each other on a 
matter of material importance,”115 but courts of Delaware (and 
other states) have nevertheless been reluctant to intervene.116 
Delaware decisions regarding independence are 
characterized by a lack of consistency.117 This is in part a 
consequence of the context-constrained nature of the inquiry 
under Delaware law. In litigation—unlike for listing 
purposes— the measure of independence is not taken in the 
abstract, but in relation to a specific board decision or 
transaction. It can enable or frustrate the application of the 
 
 112. Id. at 509 n.37 (emphasis added). This case is discussed in greater 
detail in infra Part IV. N.B. Chancellor Strine went on to serve as Chief Justice 
of Delaware, from 2014–2019. 
 113. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 114. This approach echoes that of earlier decisions by Delaware courts, 
which acknowledge the possibility of excessively close personal ties in 
principle but shy away from policing such connections. See, e.g., Zapata Corp. 
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) 
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow 
directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this 
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and 
[special litigation] committee members . . . And the further 
question arises whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and 
reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse, 
perhaps subconscious abuse. 
 115. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 126 (Del. 2016). 
 116. See Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving 
Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 62–63 (2017).  
 117. See id. at 47 n.65 (“For instance, in Oracle, it was determined that 
personal connections rose to the level of impeding independence, while in 
Beam the opposite was held.”); see also In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 
510 n.37 (“Even in the context of personal, rather than financial, relationships, 
the materiality requirement does not mean that the test cannot be met.”).  
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business judgment rule to a particular action without 
necessarily implying much about other aspects of governance.118 
As such, it does not purport to provide an assurance of ongoing 
independent monitorship in general but rather formal 
independence as to a particular policy or transaction.119 Where 
Delaware courts address independence, they routinely dismiss 
charges of bias in the absence of visible financial ties, the 
presence of a controlling shareholder, or both.120 
A 2016 decision, Sandys v. Pincus,121 provides a mixed 
example. The case turned on the question whether a majority of 
the board of the videogame maker Zynga, Inc. was independent, 
and thus whether business judgment rule immunity attached to 
a board decision exempting directors and the CEO from 
company policy restricting the timing of trades of Zynga stock.122 
Plaintiffs alleged that three directors had impermissibly close 
ties to the CEO, one in the personal sphere and the other two 
for professional reasons.123 One director co-owned a plane with 
the CEO, which for the court “signaled an extremely close, 
personal bond” that suggests “the type of very close personal 
relationship that, like family ties, one would expect to heavily 
 
 118. See, e.g., In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711–VCS, 2018 
WL 1560293, at *13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (noting that the requisite degree 
of control can be shown either to exist generally or with regard to the 
particular transaction in question); see also In re Oracle Corp. Derivative 
Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 1381331, at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) 
(discussing independence in the specific context of a demand). 
 119. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331, at *17 
(deeming each entanglement insufficient on its own “to imply lack of 
independence,” but holding that the allegations taken together created 
reasonable doubt about the ability of independent directors to objectively 
evaluate a demand to sue). 
 120. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 121. 152 A.3d 124 (Del. 2016). 
 122. See id. at 128 (“To plead demand excusal under Rales, the plaintiff 
must plead particularized factual allegations that ‘create a reasonable doubt 
that, as of the time the complaint [was] filed, the board of directors could have 
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in 
responding to a demand.’” (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 
1993))).   
 123. Id. at 126. 
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influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment.”124 
The court focused much of its analysis on the significance of this 
jointly owned asset, which constituted virtually the entire basis 
for the inference it reached that this director was not 
independent.125 Given the unusual nature of this arrangement, 
the court’s determination of its significance should not be taken 
to suggest that ties between independents and managers will be 
scrutinized more closely in general. 
The court’s analysis of the other two directors’ 
relationships, however, arguably suggests a more expansive 
view of the independence inquiry. Plaintiffs alleged that 
investment and director interlocks between these directors’ firm 
and Zynga meant the directors were not independent.126 The 
court acknowledged the need for Delaware law to allow 
“mutually beneficial ongoing business relationship[s],” but 
found it “reasonable to expect that sort of relationship might 
have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely 
toward each other.”127 In conjunction with the controlling 
shareholder status of the CEO—an important factor—the court 
held that these linkages created reasonable doubt about the 
independence of Gordon and Doerr for purposes of demand 
excusal.128 
Bracketing its status as a controlling shareholder case, 
Sandys may signal that Delaware courts will scrutinize more 
 
 124. Id. at 130 (“Co-ownership of a private plane involves a partnership in 
a personal asset that is not only very expensive, but that also requires close 
cooperation in use, which is suggestive of detailed planning indicative of a 
continuing, close personal friendship”). This relates to director Ellen Siminoff. 
 125. See id. at 129–31 (stating facts in support of the inference that 
Siminoff would not be able to act impartially when deciding whether to move 
forward with a suit implicating a close friend with whom she owned a private 
plane). The dissent’s entire discussion of Siminoff, too, focused on the meaning 
of co-ownership of a plane. Id. at 137–38 (Valihura, J., dissenting). 
 126. In addition to owning a sizable chunk (9.2 percent) of Zynga’s equity, 
the venture capital firm, Kleiner Perkins, also invested in a company 
co-founded by the CEO’s wife and in a third company that (yet another) 
Kleiner Perkins director of Zynga is invested in and on whose board he sits. 
Id. at 131, 133–34 (majority opinion). 
 127. Id. at 134 (“Causing a lawsuit to be brought against another person 
is no small matter, and is the sort of thing that might plausibly endanger a 
relationship.”). 
 128. See id. (applying Rales). 
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closely ties between managers and nominally independent 
directors. However, its facts included highly visible, 
well-evidenced personal ties and close financial and professional 
ties between the challenged directors and the CEO.129 Moreover, 
the case does not urge or imply a reconsideration of the 
application of the business judgment rule to conflict 
transactions approved by such directors. It is unlikely that 
Sandys suggests a shift away from the independent board’s 
shielding function. 
2. Federal Securities Law 
While the independentness of the board as a whole is not 
regulated by federal law, two sources of federal legislation 
require independence at the board committee level. The first is 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002130 which regulates accounting 
practices at public companies.131 Implementing regulations 
assign the audit committee direct legal responsibility for 
overseeing the engagement of the company’s independent 
auditor and prescribe certain rules designed to ensure the 
integrity of that process.132 Audit firms, in turn, must be 
“qualified and independent of their audit clients both in fact and 
in appearance.”133 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that public companies use 
independent audit committees. The statute achieves this 
 
 129. See id. at 130 (“That argument is that owning an airplane together is 
not a common thing, and suggests that the Pincus and Siminoff families are 
extremely close to each other and are among each other’s most important and 
intimate friends.”).  
 130. Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745.  
 131. See generally id. 
 132. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A–3(b)(2) (2020) (providing that audit 
committees “must be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, 
retention and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm 
engaged” for audit purposes). 
 133. See Preliminary Note to § 210.2–01, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01 (2020). The 
test for “appearance” is the perspective of a reasonable investor, and examples 
are furnished. See id. 3(b) (stating that a reasonable, informed investor would 
not conclude that the accountant is “not . . . capable of exercising objective and 
impartial judgment,” articulating standards for auditor independence, and 
providing a non-exclusive list of hypothetical auditor-client relationships 
lacking independence). 
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indirectly, by requiring stock exchanges to adopt rules requiring 
their use by listed firms.134 All individual members of public 
company audit committees must, in turn, “be independent.”135 
Audit committee members are specifically barred from 
consulting or doing other work for the company beyond their 
board service.136 They also “must otherwise be independent,”137 
by for example, meeting stock exchange tests for 
independence.138 
A second statute, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,139 adopted following the 
financial crisis and Great Recession, accomplishes something 
similar for public company compensation committees.140 Like 
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank does not impose its requirement 
directly but rather conscripts stock exchanges into regulating 
independence—here, of compensation committee 
composition.141 It is less interventionist than Sarbanes-Oxley, 
however, in that it merely directs stock exchanges to “consider” 
consulting relationships and other affiliations between directors 
and issuers, rather than requiring them to bar such 
relationships outright.142 Nonetheless, the stock exchanges have 
 
 134. See id. § 240.10A-3(b). The stock exchange rules requiring 
independent audit committees are the Listed Company Manual, § 303A.07 
Audit Committee Additional Requirements, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., 
https://perma.cc/A259-KHLZ and the Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, 
§ 5605(c)(2)(A). 
 135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(i). 
 136. See id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii)–(iii) (“[A] member of the audit 
committee . . . may not . . . [a]ccept directly or indirectly any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer or any subsidiary 
thereof . . . .”).  
 137. Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added). 
 138. See infra Part II.B. 
 139. Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376.   
 140. See generally id. 
 141. See Dodd-Frank Act § 952 (requiring that each member of the 
compensation committee of the board of directors of an issuer be a member of 
the board of directors of the issuer and otherwise be independent); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10C-1(b)(1)(i) (2020) (same).  
 142. Arguably, the fact that Dodd-Frank was less interventionist with 
regard to board independence than Sarbanes-Oxley, notwithstanding that the 
crisis that led to it was far more serious, is in tension with a common criticism 
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required that all compensation committee members be 
independent.143 
3. Stock Exchange Regulation 
The third major source of board independence rules is stock 
exchange regulation. In 2003, both leading U.S. stock 
exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq, 
began requiring boards of listed companies to consist of a 
majority of independent directors.144 NYSE’s official rationale 
for this rule is set forth in the commentary accompanying its 
rule: “[e]ffective boards of directors exercise independent 
judgment,” and independent-dominated boards “will increase 
the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of 
damaging conflicts of interest.”145 The Nasdaq rationale is 
similar.146 Both exchanges require that directors’ independent 
status be determined affirmatively by the board.147 
 
of crisis-driven regulation—namely, that it is excessively responsive to the 
passions of the moment. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities 
Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RSCH. 391, 397 (2009) (observing inadequacies in 
crisis-driven regulatory interventions). 
 143. Listed Company Manual, § 303A.05 Compensation Committee, N.Y. 
STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/2V9J-YEQN; Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra 
note 17, § 5605-5(d)(2)(A). 
 144. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, supra 
note 17 (“Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors.”); 
Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(b)(1) (“A majority of the board 
of directors must be comprised of Independent Directors . . . .”).  
 145. Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, supra 
note 17. 
 146. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17,  § 5605(b)(1)(A) (stating 
that independent directors “play an important role in assuring investor 
confidence. Through the exercise of independent judgment, they act on behalf 
of investors to maximize shareholder value in the Companies they oversee and 
guard against conflicts of interest.”). 
 147. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests, N.Y. 
STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/34JY-HHHJ (“No director qualifies as 
‘independent’ unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the 
director has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly 
or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company).”); Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17,  
§ 5605(a)(2) (“The board has a responsibility to make an affirmative 
determination that no such relationships exist through the application of Rule 
5605(a)(2).”).  
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Crucially, satisfying the exchanges’ independence rules is a 
sina qua non of listing, but does not provide much practical 
assurance that firms, once listed, will either maintain the 
required proportion of independent directors or the mandated 
levels of independence among those directors.148 No meaningful 
mechanism exists for shareholders or others to enforce these 
rules at the exchange level.149 In principle, the offending 
company could be delisted, but removing the company from the 
exchange—and for that matter, the enforcement by exchanges 
of any of their own rules against companies—is extremely 
rare.150 
The exchanges’ standards specify two categories of 
relationship that disqualify directors from being considered 
independent, one objective and the other subjective.151 NYSE’s 
objective rules deny independent status to anyone employed by 
the company (and anyone whose immediate family member was 
employed as an executive officer) in the previous three years;152 
anyone who has received more than a certain amount of money 
in direct compensation from the company during the previous 
three years, with certain limited exceptions;153 anyone with 
 
 148. See Nili, supra note 116, at 40 (“[T]he current regulatory approach 
has also lacked effective enforcement.”).  
 149. See id. (“Companies’ self-designations of director independence are 
left uncontested and are done without proper vetting or auditing by the stock 
exchanges or the SEC, as they have shown no effort to proactively enforce their 
own requirements.”). 
 150. See infra Part III.C. 
 151. Item 407 of Regulation S-K adds a securities regulation layer to this 
mandate, requiring that independent directors be identified as such on the 
issuer’s proxy or, in the case of a company conducting an initial public offering, 
in its registration statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2020) (incorporating 
by reference the exchanges’ own standards for their listed companies). This 
regulation does not constitute a freestanding federal law requirement that 
companies maintain independent boards, however. 
 152. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests, supra 
note 147. 
 153. See id. § 303A.02(b)(ii) (establishing a limit of $120,000 in direct 
compensation in any twelve-month period during the prior three years, 
excluding fees paid for director or committee service or pension, “other forms 
of deferred compensation for prior service (provided such compensation is not 
contingent in any way on continued service),” and any compensation received 
for service as interim chairman or in an interim executive capacity). 
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close relationships to the company’s independent auditor;154 and 
directors with a few other types of particularly salient 
conflicts.155 Nasdaq’s objective rules are substantially 
identical.156 
In addition to these objective criteria, both exchanges have 
adopted high-level, qualitative standards concerning the 
definition of independence. NYSE’s standard provides that 
directors who have any “material relationship with the listed 
company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer 
of an organization that has a relationship with the company)” 
cannot be deemed independent.157 In acknowledgment of the 
porousness of this definition, the commentary to the NYSE rules 
expresses a need to “broadly consider all relevant facts and 
circumstances.”158 For example, when making its independence 
determination, the board should consider the question of 
materiality “not merely from the standpoint of the director, but 
also from that of persons or organizations with which the 
director has an affiliation.”159 Relationships that should be 
deemed material under the NYSE standard “can include 
commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, 
charitable and familial relationships, among others.”160 Notably 
absent from this list is direct mention of close personal 
friendships, though the language of the list is illustrative rather 
 
 154. See id. § 303A.02(b)(iii)(A) (stating that a director cannot be 
considered independent if he is an employee of the company’s auditor).  
 155. See id. § 303A.02(b)(iv) (concerning conflicts arising from 
compensation committee interlocks); id. § 303A.02(b)(v) (concerning conflicts 
arising from outside employment with a company doing over $1 million in 
business with the listed company); id. § 303A.02 (noting that in certain cases, 
contributions to charities of which an independent director serves as an 
executive officer must be disclosed); see also Nili, supra note 116, at 49–50 
(concerning, e.g., compensation committee membership).   
 156. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(a)(2).  
 157. Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests, supra note 
147 (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. (noting the impossibility of gauging all factors that “might bear on 
the materiality of a director’s relationship”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (“[A]s the concern is independence from management, the 
Exchange does not view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by 
itself, as a bar to an independence finding.”(emphasis added)). 
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than exhaustive and, based on other language in the 
commentary, prudence demands that boards consider such 
relationships.161 
The Nasdaq qualitative standard sets a higher bar for 
independence than its NYSE counterpart. This is clear from the 
plain text of the Nasdaq definition of relationships that would 
disqualify a director from being considered independent: it lacks 
a materiality requirement, instead barring any complicating 
relationship.162 The exchange’s commentary explains that this 
standard prohibits independent directors from having merely “a 
relationship with the listed Company that would impair [the 
director’s] independence;” there is no discussion of 
materiality.163 The only major exception to the NYSE and 
 
 161. For example, boards are required to weigh “all relevant facts and 
circumstances” bearing on independence. Id. (“It is not possible to anticipate, 
or explicitly to provide for, all circumstances that might signal potential 
conflicts of interest, or that might bear on the materiality of a director’s 
relationship to a listed company.”). 
 162. Nasdaq defines an independent director as “a person other than an 
Executive Officer or employee of the Company or any other individual having 
a relationship which, in the opinion of the Company’s board of directors, would 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the 
responsibilities of a director.” Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, 
§ 5605(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. § 5605(a)(2) IM-5605 (emphasis added). The absence of a 
materiality requirement in both the standard and the commentary is 
significant. While NYSE requires relationships to be “material” to be 
disqualifying from an independence standpoint, Nasdaq would deny that label 
to a director with any relationship that would interfere with her independence, 
a formulation that would appear to more easily reach personal relationships. 
Id. That the Nasdaq rules use the term “material” repeatedly to refer to other 
types of conflicts bolsters the notion that the rule drafters deliberately omitted 
it in the context of independence. See, e.g., id. § 5605(d)(2)(A) (concerning 
“material” relationships of compensation committee members); Gregory H. 
Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
1246, 1265–66 (2017) (discussing the distinction between NYSE and Nasdaq 
rules concerning director relationships); cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section 
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.” (citations omitted)). 
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Nasdaq requirement that listed companies adopt 
majority-independent boards is for controlled companies.164 
As a formal matter, both NYSE and Nasdaq place the 
process of nominating directors in the hands of independent 
directors. NYSE accomplishes this by requiring that listed firms 
constitute a nominating and governance committee composed 
exclusively of independent directors.165 Nasdaq requires that 
nominees be selected either by an all-independent nominating 
committee or by the independent members of a 
majority-independent board.166 
Though they exclude direct management participation in 
the process, the degree of authentic (as opposed to formal) 
independence mandated by these rules is debatable. For 
example, both exchanges allow companies to change the 
decisionmakers contractually, by granting to a shareholder the 
exclusive right to nominate a director.167 But the more 
important qualification, discussed infra at Part III.A., is the 
extraordinary influence management exercises over the process 
from top to bottom. 
* * * 
Past work urging improvements to the independent director 
model has tended to focus on relatively modest 
changes— tightening up the definition of independence and 
 
 164. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, supra note 80 
(exempting NYSE-listed controlled companies from the independent-board 
requirement); Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5615(c) (same for 
Nasdaq-listed controlled companies). 
 165. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04(a)–(b) Nominating/ 
Corporate Governance Committee, supra note 79 (requiring companies to 
establish “a nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of 
independent directors” to identify and nominate “individuals qualified to 
become board members”); Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee 
Functions and Communications Between Security Holders and Boards of 
Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 8340, 81 SEC Docket 2135 (Nov. 24, 
2003) (requiring disclosures for nominating committees and boards). 
 166. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(e). 
 167. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04(a) Nominating/Corporate 
Governance Committee, supra note 79; Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 
17, § 5605(e)(4). Typically, such a right would be exchanged for something of 
value, such as a standstill provision in a settlement agreement with an activist 
shareholder that stipulates the shareholder will cease trading the company’s 
stock. 
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improving the quality of disclosures around it,168 for example, or 
enhancing the autonomy of the independent director in 
general169 or in controlled companies in particular.170 These 
commendable ideas are styled in the nature of friendly 
amendments to the current paradigm. As such, they do not seek 
to address shortcomings inherent in the independent board of 
substituting outside directors for judicial and regulatory 
oversight. Those shortcomings are most consequential in the 
sphere of board action where independent directors wield the 
power to activate the business judgment rule. 
III.  Limitations of the Independent Board 
Independent directors must satisfy legal criteria detailed in 
Part II, but even the sum of these requirements falls short of 
authentic independence in the ordinary sense of the word. 
“Independent” has such meanings as “not subject to control by 
others,” “not requiring or relying on something else,” and “not 
looking to others for one’s opinions or for guidance in 
conduct.”171 Independent directors labor under well-documented 
limitations that require them to seek management guidance 
and grant management a considerable measure of control over 
them.172 These deficits hinder independents’ capacity and 
 
 168. See Nili, supra note 116, at 70–74 (describing how disclosure 
requirements can be altered to improve the independent director regime). 
Elsewhere, Nili has cautioned against excessive reliance on the independent 
board. See Yaron Nili, The Fallacy of Director Independence, 2020 WISC. L. 
REV. 491 (2020). 
 169 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865 
(1991) (proposing increased independence from management through 
increased dependence on shareholders). 
 170. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors 
and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2017) (describing 
a regime to give independent directors more power with changes such as veto 
rights). 
 171. Independent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 172. Fairfax, supra note 83, at 132 (“[T]here exist significant limitations 
on independent directors’ ability to fulfill their monitoring role, and it is very 
difficult to overcome those limitations, especially as independent directors’ 
responsibilities increase.”). 
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incentives and predictably generate boards that shield 
managers.173 
The aspirational literature regarding the independent 
board and its potential to improve governance and performance 
is difficult to square with the evidence. Independent directors 
tend to be “thinly informed, under-resourced, and boundedly 
motivated,”174 and “more independent of shareholders than they 
are of management.”175 Proposed fixes abound.176 Some 
changes—to the composition, structure, and incentives of board 
membership, for example—have been adopted with a view to 
“reduc[ing] deviations from shareholder-value 
maximization.”177 Yet managers may frequently “exert 
excessive influence over [board] governance mechanisms, 
exploiting a collective action barrier to effective monitoring by 
dispersed equity owners.”178 This Part reviews factors that 
chronically impair effective supervision by independent boards. 
A.  Structural Bias, Self-Interest, and Social Perception 
Boards of directors are subject to many of the same 
propensities that characterize decision-making by other groups 
of human beings.179 This fact colors their decisions on key 
 
 173. See id. at 177 (“[D]ependence, coupled with the social ties and 
structural bias common among directors, significantly hinders independent 
directors’ ability to be impartial.”). 
 174. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 366. 
 175. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 169, at 873. 
 176. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 170, at 1293–95 (proposing 
“enhanced-independence” directors); Nili, supra note 116, at 70–76 (proposing 
to increase independent director disclosure requirements); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors 
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 912 (2013); 
Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 151 (proposing giving more power to the 
shareholders); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 169, at 865 (advocating 
reforms to “increas[e] the dependence of outside directors on shareholders”). 
 177. Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 850. Questions around whether the 
purpose of the firm should remain solely to maximize shareholder wealth are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 178. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 47, at 1865. 
 179. See Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director 
Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 259 (2009) (“Although people are 
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matters of corporate policy, even where their self-interest may 
not be directly implicated. For example, directors might ask 
themselves: 
[S]hould we approve the CEO compensation package? (Yes, 
because he is like us, a member of my group, and thus he 
deserves it; and for directors who are also CEOs, yes, because 
it may favorably affect my own compensation.) Should we 
approve another firm’s takeover bid of our company? (No, 
because we have managed the firm well and because I want 
to retain the benefits associated with board membership.) 
Should we allow a derivative suit to go forward? (No, because 
this involves a suit against a group of which I am a 
member . . . .).180 
The human frailties referenced in parentheses have been 
documented in an extensive literature. 
1.  Social Biases 
Regardless of their formal status as independent, directors 
sometimes exhibit what psychologists call ingroup bias, or “the 
tendency to favor one’s own group, its members, its 
characteristics, and its products, particularly in reference to 
other groups.”181 Such directors, even when acting in good faith, 
may be unconsciously biased in favor of other directors because 
they view other board members as part of their group.182 This 
can contribute to a structural bias—“the bias resulting from 
board members’ interactions with one another after joining the 
 
aware of many biases, they will frequently not recognize situations involving 
potential bias and conflict of interest.”). 
 180. Id. 
 181. APA Dictionary of Psychology, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://perma.cc
/FWG9-9YBB.  
 182. See Page, supra note 179, at 252 (“Directors, even those defined as 
independent, are members of the board of directors and, so the theory goes, 
are likely to be biased in favor of other directors.”); Fairfax, supra note 83, at 
153 (“[T]he psychological research with respect to structural bias is 
particularly relevant in the context of boards, highlighting the degree to which 
such bias undermines directors’ ability to be critical of their fellow directors.”). 
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board”183—that, in Lisa Fairfax’s formulation, “makes it 
normatively difficult to have truly independent directors.”184 
While scholars of corporate boards often advocate changes 
to the incentives or independence levels of directors, “powerful 
psychological factors are at work within the boardroom”185 that 
can render such initiatives moot. These forces “creat[e] a 
cohesive, loyal, conforming ingroup that will support its 
members for positive and negative reasons, under low and high 
levels of motivation and group values.”186 Personal and 
professional connections, typical among board members, can 
exacerbate ingroup or structural bias,187 and this effect can be 
more pronounced where, as is often the case, boards are 
relatively homogeneous in makeup.188 Efforts to address other 
problems in the independent board often create tradeoffs in this 
 
 183. Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’ 
Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 118 (2016). 
 184. Fairfax, supra note 83, at 153; see Page, supra note 179, at 245–56 
‘(describing different kinds of bias). 
 185. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 99 (“Prior or ongoing interaction 
between individuals, called interpersonal familiarity in the psychological 
literature, has been repeatedly demonstrated to be a source for strong biases 
favoring a familiar ingroup and correlatively disfavoring a threatening or 
unfamiliar outgroup.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Page, supra note 179, at 252 (“Director nominees will often be 
friends or have social connections with other board members, thereby 
exacerbating biases.”); Nili, supra note 183, at 118 (noting preexisting social 
ties and length of director service as factors that could affect true 
independence). 
 188. See Page, supra note 179, at 253 (“Today directors still tend to have 
relatively strong ties and similarities, as they tend to be fairly homogeneous. 
More generally, groups that are essentially self-selecting will often have 
homogeneous attitudes, since people naturally tend to form relationships with 
those who are similar.”). Despite movement towards greater gender and racial 
diversity at the board level, in 2018, over 60 percent of directorships at the top 
100 companies were held by white males. See DELOITTE, MISSING PIECES 
REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON 
FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 9 (2019) (“The representation of women and minorities 
in the Fortune 100 has reached a high of 38.6 percent, outpacing the broader 
Fortune 500, which is 34 percent.”). 
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area.189 For example, longer director tenure, traditionally 
promoted as a way of enhancing director knowledge and 
effectiveness, can intensify this problem: over time, ties among 
directors are likely to strengthen, as they become more likely to 
identify as part of the group, thus reducing diligence and 
monitoring.190 
Delaware law acknowledges the potential for structural 
bias among independent directors, but the response it has 
developed—doctrines that regulate conflicts in individual 
transactions—ignore the constant, systemic nature of the 
problem.191 The result is that, with the exception of takeover 
defenses (on which more shortly), Delaware law effectively rules 
out structural bias as a basis for challenging the independent 
status of a director. 
2.  Directors’ Desire to Be Renominated to the Board 
Nowhere are social biases more consequential than in the 
process of determining who sits on the board. Delaware law 
recognizes that directors may be biased in favor of actions that 
preserve their seats192 along with the pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits they bring.193 But the question has 
special bite when it comes to the question of being renominated 
to the board or recommended for other boards or executive 
roles.194 
 
 189. See Nili, supra note 183, at 118 (highlighting the tension and 
tradeoffs between tenure, social connections, and structural bias). 
 190. See id. (“Importantly, tenure potentially affects not only preexisting 
and newly formed social ties with management, but also increases this 
structural bias, making it less likely that any single director would be willing 
to voice an opinion if such opinion might jeopardize the close-knit atmosphere 
of the boardroom.”).  
 191. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 192. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 
1985) (discussing this phenomenon in the context of boards weighing takeover 
defenses). 
 193. See Page, supra note 179, at 253–55 (noting that directorship benefits 
include compensation, access to firm resources such as charitable donations, 
social validation, and valuable skills or contacts).  
 194. See id. at 255 (“Directors thus are likely biased in favor of decisions 
that allow them to continue as directors, including decisions in favor of those 
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As a formal matter, public company director nominations 
and renominations are generally committed to the independent 
directorate.195 Nevertheless, CEOs “have had considerable and 
sometimes decisive influence over the nomination process,”196 
even when they have “not formally serv[ed] on the nominating 
committee.”197 In some cases it may even be said that 
“management effectively controls director nomination.”198 For a 
rational CEO, there is little more important than the identity of 
the company’s independent directors. Such directors are 
uniquely positioned to cleanse conduct that falls within a gray 
zone of personally benefiting the CEO while producing some 
theoretical or minimal benefit to the corporation.199 Managers, 
therefore, can be expected to prioritize the nomination and 
renomination of friendly directors.200 
The most important step in becoming a director is being 
selected as a nominee. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried wrote 
in 2004 that “candidates placed on the company’s slate by the 
board have been virtually assured of being reelected.”201 In 
recent years, this trend has not abated.202 Directors of Russell 
3000 companies received average shareholder “for” votes 
 
people who determine future board membership, such as a controlling 
shareholder or those directors serving on nomination committees.”); Nili, 
supra note 183, at 122 (“Because the overwhelming majority of director 
elections are uncontested, inclusion in the company’s ballot is paramount to a 
director’s ability to be elected and to subsequently hold her seat.”). 
 195. See supra Part II. 
 196. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 26 (2004).   
 197. Id. 
 198. Nili, supra note 183, at 122. 
 199. See id. (describing the dependency that directors have on 
management to get reelected). 
 200. See id. (“This current structure of director election, where 
management effectively controls director nomination, puts directors in a 
potentially compromised position, and forces them to consider the 
ramifications for their reelection if they choose to confront management or 
their peer directors.”). 
 201. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 196, at 25.   
 202. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS (2016–2019) 
AND 2020 SEASON PREVIEW 34 fig.1.3 (2019), https://perma.cc/7SN6-DDPM 
(PDF) (showing that the trend to elect candidates appointed by the board has 
continued). 
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exceeding 95 percent in every year between 2016 and 2019.203 In 
that window’s most challenging proxy season, fewer than 3 
percent of incumbent directors failed to exceed 70 percent 
support, and 99.7 percent—all but 54 directors out of 
16,492— received majority support.204 Directors have no serious 
incentive to oppose management and every incentive to stay in 
its good graces, since doing so virtually assures renomination 
and reelection. 
These basic facts contradict the assumptions of Delaware 
law, which expects directors to pretend that no consequences 
will attach if they take a more active role in disciplining 
managers or their fellow directors.205 Delaware law goes so far 
as to presume that directors are unlikely to make decisions that 
would jeopardize their reputation as impartial.206 Implicit in 
this logic is the notion that directors are less responsible to their 
CEOs and director peers than to a higher-order, objective 
reputational interest that will judge them harshly for going 
along to get along. There is neither much evidence nor reason to 
believe that directors interpret their fiduciary duties so nobly, 
or that the director labor market punishes deferential directors 
or rewards active ones.207 Reputation is a relational concept, and 
“it seems likely that the group or self-interested decision is not 
one that carries any reputational risk.”208 Rather, “the relevant 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004) (demonstrating 
that directors are assumed to think there is no consequence for actively 
disciplining others in the company). 
 206. See id. (noting that directors are presumed not to be more willing to 
risk their reputation than risk the relationship with the director or officer 
whose conduct is challenged).  
 207. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Andrew Lund & Robert J. Schonlau, 
Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment 
from the Financial Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 64–75 (2014) (finding that 
for outside directors at financial institutions, the exogenous shock of the 2008 
financial crisis only raised the probability of a director being replaced for poor 
firm performance a tiny amount (a difference of 40 basis points, or 0.99 percent 
at financial firms versus 0.59 percent at non-financials)). 
 208. Page, supra note 179, at 256. 
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reputation for directors is the one among their peers, who face 
the same issues and are likely to be quite sympathetic.”209 
Since directors, once suggested by the nominating 
committee, are typically nominated by the board, the recent 
trend towards holding director elections annually rather than 
every three years may exacerbate the problem of directorial bias 
as it can be expected to make directors more attentive to their 
colleagues’ perceptions of them.210 Thus, a director’s desire to 
retain a favorable professional reputation among both the 
managers and her current peers on the board—and her 
potential future peers on other boards and C-suites—may lead 
to less active monitoring, in contrast to the greater diligence 
envisioned by the Delaware Supreme Court. 
B.  Evidentiary Barriers 
While Delaware law admits of the potential for structural 
or ingroup bias to compromise the independence of directors, it 
makes it nearly impossible to demonstrate. One example of a 
situation where such bias commonly arises is where a 
shareholder plaintiff claims the board is incapable of passing 
judgment impartially on a derivative suit demand because a 
majority of the directors are not independent.211 In an early case 
addressing the issue, the Delaware Supreme Court admonished 
that “we must be mindful that directors are passing judgment 
on fellow directors in the same corporation . . . who [may have] 
designated them to serve both as directors and committee 
members.”212 Read together, three cases illustrate how this 
language has remained largely aspirational. 
First, in a civil lawsuit over allegations of insider trading at 
Martha Stewart’s company, the court observed that 
 
 209. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 859–60 (2004). 
 210. See Nili, supra note 183, at 122–23 (arguing that because a majority 
of boards “now face annual elections,” “[t]he continued dependency on 
management . . . could potentially make these directors even more concerned 
about their reelection and securing management and peer support, as they 
now are granted only one-year terms”). 
 211. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) 
(demonstrating the difficulty of demonstrating ingroup bias in the law). 
 212. Id. (emphasis added). 
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“[i]ndependence is a fact-specific determination made in the 
context of a particular case.”213 Plaintiffs alleging a lack of 
independence face a difficult burden of proof: allegations of a 
“mere personal friendship or a mere outside business 
relationship, standing alone, are insufficient,” i.e., they do not 
“raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.”214 To 
meet that burden, such that putatively independent directors 
can be found unable to act impartially, their friendship with the 
director or officer whose conduct is at issue must be of a 
“bias-producing nature.”215 Specifically, that bias must 
overcome a presumption of loyalty: she must be shown to prefer 
to risk her reputation than risk her relationship with the 
interested director or officer.216 
In practice, courts have been extremely reluctant to find a 
conflict undermining impartiality absent an external, material 
signifier of a close relationship. For example, in Sandys, 
described supra at Part II, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that shared ownership of a private plane by a putatively 
independent director and the company CEO “signaled an 
extremely close, personal bond” akin to family and supported an 
inference that that director would not be able to act impartially 
with regard to a suit against the CEO.217 The court reached a 
similar conclusion regarding other directors based on financial 
interconnections.218 A dissenting Justice would have found the 
directors, including the one who shared a plane with the CEO, 
 
 213. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049. 
 214. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added); see id. (“In order to show lack of 
independence, the complaint of a stockholder-plaintiff must create a 
reasonable doubt that a director is not so ‘beholden’ to an interested director 
(in this case Stewart) that his or her ‘discretion would be sterilized.’”). 
 215. See id. (stating that the decision in question concerned actions 
adverse to Stewart, to whom it was alleged the directors met the Delaware 
standard of beholdenness). 
 216. See id. at 1052 (“[P]laintiff must plead facts that would support the 
inference that because of the nature of a relationship[,] . . . the non-interested 
director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the 
relationship with the interested director.”). 
 217.  Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 130 (Del. 2016). 
 218. See id. at 131–34 (finding that personal bonds and personal 
interconnections can produce bias). 
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independent (as the lower court had).219 In another case, 
involving the board of Oracle Corporation, the court reached the 
same conclusion—that directors lacked independence—but only 
upon a showing of significant financial and professional 
interlocks, including essentially a joint investment in real 
property between a director and the CEO.220 
It would be a mistake to read Sandys and this Oracle case221 
as generally suggestive of a trend towards more exacting 
standards of independence, for they had two unusual facts in 
common. In each case, the board had previously determined that 
one or more directors whose independence was challenged in the 
suit did not meet the pertinent stock exchange’s standards for 
independence,222 which are arguably less exacting than 
Delaware’s.223 In addition, the CEO in each case also had the 
status of (or was plausibly alleged to have been) a controller of 
the corporation.224 While such a designation does not 
automatically trigger a finding that directors lack the requisite 
characteristics of independence, the court in Sandys 
emphasized that the existence of a controlling shareholder in 
the company was relevant to its determination that three 
 
 219. See id. at 134–35 (Valihura, J., dissenting) (finding that the directors 
were independent because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts that would 
establish a material relationship). 
 220. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 
1381331, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (showing that together with her 
husband, one director owned two condos on an island 98 percent owned by the 
CEO). 
 221. A note of disambiguation: there are a great many Delaware corporate 
law cases in the past few decades to which the Oracle Corporation lends its 
name. They do not necessarily relate to one another. 
 222. See Sandys, 152 A.3d at 131 (noting that Zynga disclosed to the 
exchange on which its shares were listed, Nasdaq, that two directors were not 
independent); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 2018 WL 1381331, at 
*18 (making the same determination with regard to one director’s 
independence under NYSE listing standards). 
 223. See supra Part II. 
 224. See Sandys, 152 A.3d at 126 (stating that the CEO was a controlling 
shareholder); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331, at *16 
(declining to determine whether the CEO was a controlling shareholder, but 
noting his status as a 28 percent owner and co-founder of the company and 
describing plaintiffs’ allegation that he “maintain[ed] a firm grip on Oracle’s 
day-to-day operations”). 
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directors were not independent.225 In sum, not only was the close 
nature of the relationship in each case evidenced by tangible 
pecuniary connections, but the company itself had determined 
that directors whose independence was challenged had in fact 
failed a key test of independence—and the specter of 
controller-initiated removal loomed over the directors of both 
boards. 
As discussed infra at Part IV, takeovers are something of 
an exception to Delaware’s lax treatment of structural bias. In 
such cases, courts take cognizance of the potential for structural 
bias and apply an enhanced scrutiny standard (rather than the 
deferential business judgment standard) when evaluating the 
validity of defenses adopted by the board.226 While courts apply 
a formally heightened standard of review in these cases, they 
also validate the challenged measures even when the effect of 
doing so is to indefinitely entrench managers by allowing them 
to “just say no” to takeovers.227 
C.  Self-Interested and Uninformative Self-Designations of 
Independence 
The systems used to define and designate directors as 
independent are characterized by a lack of rigor, coherence, 
accountability, and transparency. Under state law, federal law, 
and stock exchange listing requirements, the board of directors 
determines the independence of its own directors in the first 
instance.228 This determination, which is subject to the influence 
 
 225. See Sandys, 152 A.3d at 133 (“[O]ur courts cannot blind themselves 
to that reality when considering whether a director on a controlled company 
board has other ties to the controller beyond her relationship at the controlled 
company.”). 
 226. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 
1985)  
Because of the omnipresent specter [when a board addresses a 
pending takeover bid] that a board may be acting primarily in its 
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial 
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business 
judgment rule may be conferred.  
 227. See id. at 954; infra Part IV.C.1. 
 228. See supra Part II.  
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of the same self-interested and ingroup propensities discussed 
above, is preliminary in theory but often final in fact.229 
Under Delaware law, the only way to challenge a board’s 
incantation of director independence is by lawsuit, where a 
plaintiff must identify and attack a specific board decision and 
satisfy procedural and substantive requirements before being 
entitled to any discovery on the very question she is litigating.230 
Stock exchanges retain the authority to take disciplinary 
measures to enforce their listing standards, up to and including 
delisting; in practice, however, they rarely enforce their own 
rules.231 For example, “in 2017, the NYSE brought twenty-five 
disciplinary actions, but none of them involved disclosure/listing 
rules violations.”232 Exchanges are in competition for business 
and lack an incentive to enforce strictly,233 and the federal 
securities laws do not provide a private right of action for a 
violation of exchange rules.234 A plaintiff could in theory bring a 
federal securities fraud suit over false disclosures regarding 
director independence in a company’s proxy statement, but an 
 
 229. See, e.g., Nili, supra note 116, at 53–63. 
 230. See id. at 63 (“[S]tate law enforcement is limited to litigation, and 
while shareholders can challenge the independence of directors in Delaware 
courts, these challenges must be made in connection with a shareholder 
challenge to a specific board action, and must cross procedural and substantive 
thresholds before discovery.”).  
 231. See id. (“[I]n the context of the stock exchange listing rules, the 
designation of directors as independent is designed to be difficult to enforce, 
and in practice is rarely enforced.”). 
 232. Timothy J. Johnston, Is Mandatory Real-Time Disclosure Really 
Mandatory? A Comparison of Real-Time Disclosure Frameworks and 
Enforcement, 47 SEC. REGUL. L.J. 1, 11 (2019). 
 233. See id. at 8 (“Continuous disclosure regimes require listed companies 
to disclose material information as a positive, proactive, and broad obligation.” 
(citing Gill North, National Company Disclosure Regulatory Frameworks: 
Superficially Similar but Substantively Different, 3 J. MARSHALL GLOB. MKT. 
L.J. 187, 218 (2015))). 
 234. See, e.g., NASDAQ OMX Grp. v. UBS, Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1046 
(2d Cir. 2014) (Straub, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is undisputed that the Exchange 
Act does not provide for a private cause of action for violations of stock 
exchange rules.”). 
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even higher standard of proof attaches to such claims than to a 
claim of fiduciary duty breach under Delaware law.235 
Finally, despite the fact that many sources of law mandate 
and regulate independence, they do not require much by way of 
disclosure about what makes a director independent.236 
Investors are thus in the dark over the nature of any potential 
director biases as well as the process by which the board reached 
its independence determinations.237 
Yaron Nili has characterized this patchwork disclosure 
system as “too much, too little, too late, and too soft.”238 It affords 
boards “too much’” discretion over directors’ independence 
status determinations;239 provides investors “too little” 
information regarding the company’s independence standards 
(and how directors satisfy them);240 when a director’s 
independence is challenged under state law, it is frequently too 
late, “as these assessments are done post-hoc when it is too late 
to address many of the issues that director independence is 
 
 235. See Shill, supra note 163, at 1265–66 (“A body of literature asserts 
that the ascendance of the independent-dominated board has heightened the 
agency costs problem, by making it easy for boards to nominate 
management-friendly directors who meet stock exchange and Delaware 
independence standards but do not act as a meaningful check on 
management.”).  
 236. See Nili, supra note 116, at 63 (“[T]he current designation system of 
directors as independent may suffer from structural concerns, and there are 
numerous anecdotal examples demonstrating the deficiencies and lack of 
proper disclosure by companies.”). The optimal level and form of disclosure is 
a topic all its own. For an exploration of the costs and benefits of disclosure in 
the context of initial public offerings, for example, see Jeremy McClane, 
Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure in Securities Dealmaking, 72 VAND. 
L. REV. 191 (2019). 
 237. David F. Larcker et al., 2015 Investor Survey: Deconstructing Proxy 
Statements—What Matters to Investors, STAN. BUS. GRADUATE SCH. (Feb. 
2015), https://perma.cc/9X9X-JNB7 (finding that 60 percent of institutional 
investors view company independence disclosures as somewhat or not at all 
effective).  
 238. Nili, supra note 116, at 53.  
 239. See id. (“It provides companies with too much discretion, as boards 
retain too much power to assert the independence of their peer directors, and 
they may suffer from behavioral bias in doing so.”).  
 240. See id. (“It provides investors with too little information regarding the 
factual context against which a director is considered to be independent.”). 
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meant to protect against” ex ante;241 and “too soft,” as 
independence designations are rarely uncontested or vetted by 
the stock exchanges or the SEC.242 These drawbacks, however, 
are the product of larger problems upstream from the disclosure 
regime, which suggests limited returns to tweaking that regime. 
D.  Quantum and Structure of Director Compensation 
In recent years, compensation of directors has risen and its 
structure has changed from all cash to majority equity, with the 
goal of incentivizing higher director performance. This 
transition has altered the director role somewhat. 
An independent directorship at a large company is a 
prestigious role asking five hours of work per week for 
$255,000 in median annual salary. This workload, which is 
reported by directors themselves, amounts to a wage of 
approximately $1,000 an hour . . . . As has been widely 
documented, this combination has led to effective capture of 
independent directors [by managers].243 
The rise in director compensation complicates issues 
around financial ties and actual (as opposed to mere legal) 
independence.244 
Compensation for a director on a single board may be 
considered nominal because directors typically have a high net 
worth.245 However, directors frequently serve on multiple 
boards and may be loath to endanger their reputation as an 
agreeable board member on any of them, which might place 
seven figures of annual income at risk.246 Even the median 
 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Shill, supra note 163, at 1267.  
 244. See id. (explaining the salary of an independent director).  
 245. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 155 (“[D]irector compensation is often 
characterized as nominal, and hence it may not warrant serious 
concern . . . . However, it cannot be considered nominal; indeed, the fact that 
the average directorial compensation package exceeds the thresholds for 
independence under federal rules reflects this.”).  
 246. See id. (“[T]he fact that directors have other sources of compensation 
may reduce any concern that their board compensation may jeopardize their 
impartiality.”).  
Shill.ICErecon (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:06 PM 
THE INDEPENDENT BOARD AS SHIELD 1857 
 
quantum a director receives for service on a single 
large-company board is deemed material in an important, 
relevant sense: it is more than double the amount that stock 
exchanges allow outside directors to be paid in direct 
compensation.247 In fact, for this reason, the exchanges 
specifically exempt director compensation from determinations 
of “material” connections to the firm.248 If the exchanges’ listing 
standards did not do so, virtually no directors would be 
considered independent under their own rules.249 
More broadly, the trend towards paying more director 
compensation in equity represents a questionable mirroring of 
a trend in executive compensation known as “pay for 
performance.”250 While that model is subject to many 
critiques,251 there is no great logical leap required to justify 
linking the pay of the head of a firm to the performance of the 
firm. However, the rationale for extending it into the realm of 
monitoring is less clear, and “the expansion of 
payment-for-performance plans into the director arena is 
puzzling.”252 
Incentive pay for monitoring directors is something of an 
oxymoron. Unlike executives, individual directors have little 
 
 247. See, e.g., Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests, 
supra note 147 (establishing a limit of $120,000 in direct compensation in any 
twelve-month period during the prior three years, but exempting fees paid for 
board service); Fairfax, supra note 83, at 154.  
 248. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 155 (“This failure to account for director 
compensation runs counter to the clear consensus regarding the 
bias-producing nature of financial ties.”).  
 249. See id. (“Based on these rules, if directors’ board fees were not 
excluded, the current amount of such fees would exclude the average director 
from being considered independent under both [Sarbanes-Oxley] and 
NASDAQ.”). 
 250. See Katherine M. Brown, Note, New Demands, Better Boards: 
Rethinking Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate 
Governance, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102, 1122–29 (2007) (summarizing tradeoffs 
involved in the trend towards increasing the equity component of 
compensation). 
 251. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 196 (analyzing the power 
corporate executives have to influence their own pay and the structural defects 
that lead to this system). 
 252. See Brown, supra note 250, at 1132 (documenting difficulties in 
measuring and incentivizing director performance). 
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power to control or direct the corporation in any specific 
direction.253 While management is tasked with driving the 
company forward and improving value for shareholders, 
directors are tasked with monitoring, which cannot be 
adequately judged solely through equity or other performance 
targets.254 Thus, equity compensation can be expected to be a 
weaker motivator for directors than management.255 
Where incentive pay for directors does motivate, there is 
reason to ask whether its effects are wholly benign.256 Charles 
Elson, an early advocate of equity compensation for directors, 
wrote that it is designed to align director interests with those of 
shareholders.257 However, it remains immaterial to most 
directors when compared to their net worth.258 As a result, even 
when paid largely in equity, independent directors have little 
skin in the game—but where a director accumulates 
considerable equity in the firm (through stock grants conferred 
over the course of a lengthy tenure, for example), her 
 
 253. See id. at 1126 (“Equity compensation may simply be an insufficient 
motivator of director behavior.”).  
 254. See id. at 1132. 
 255. See Claudia Zeitz Poster & Mark R. Ullman, Director Pay: What 
Makes Sense Today, DIRS. & BDS., 3d Quarter 2006, at 42, 46 (illustrating that 
payment for performance induces directors to act like managers and, thus, 
erodes the distinction between the two).  
 256. See Brown, supra note 250, at 1125–29 (arguing that director equity 
compensation is undesirable on net). 
 257. See Charles Elson, Director Compensation and the 
Management-Captured Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 
SMU L. REV. 127, 135 (1996) (endorsing equity-based director compensation 
as a mechanism for reuniting ownership and control and enhancing board 
engagement); Michael Barrier, The Compensation Balance, INTERNAL 
AUDITOR, June 2002, at 46 (cataloging opinions that equity ownership ties 
director interests more closely to shareholders).  
 258. See Brown, supra note 250, at 1115  
[F]inancial compensation may also influence the decision to serve 
on a board, though only minimally for wealthy members. The 
amount received as compensation for board service is generally very 
small relative to the director’s other income and overall net worth. 
Most directors are “successful professionals who have built 
significant wealth,” and do not serve on boards for the monetary 
rewards. (quoting Jay W. Lorsch, The Fuss Over Director’s Pay and 
Pensions—Is Stock Ownership Really the Answer?, DIRECTORSHIP, 
June 1996, at 3).  
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impartiality may be dubious when she is presented with a 
decision that may harm the value of her equity, at least in the 
short run, such as by challenging a questionable ethical 
practice.259 The prevailing market assumption appears to be 
that a “Goldilocks” mix of cash and equity aligns director and 
shareholder incentives without compromising director 
independence, but there is little evidence it accomplishes any of 
the above. Further, once ratified by shareholders, the quantum 
and structure of director compensation are protected by the 
business judgment rule and become essentially unreviewable.260 
E.  Asymmetries in Information and Resources 
Beyond the audit committee, no regulation requires that 
independent directors have any particular skills or 
knowledge.261 The market for directors is reasonably good at 
ensuring directors have general business competence, but they 
often lack industry or company specific knowledge that may be 
necessary to determine the correct course of action.262 Thus, 
even when information presented about the company is 
accurate, complete, and free of manipulation, directors may 
simply lack the knowledge and skill necessary to fulfill their 
 
 259. See Nili, supra note 183, at 121 (“[D]irectors might refrain from acting 
diligently and independently when such actions would have a negative impact 
on firm value and in turn on their equity, in the short to intermediate term, 
even if such action would potentially improve long-term value.”).  
 260. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1211 (Del. 
2017) (stating that shareholder ratification triggers business judgment review 
“as long as the [director compensation] plan has ‘meaningful limits’ on the 
awards directors can make to themselves”); infra Part IV.C.2. 
 261. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 
(regulating the disclosure of audit committee financial experts).  
 262. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super 
Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 29 (2017) 
(“[W]hile many outside directors . . . may have general business skills, most of 
them lack the relevant firm or industry-specific knowledge.”); see also Fairfax, 
supra note 83, at 164–65 (“Thus, studies reveal that while many directors have 
knowledge about general business matters, few have knowledge regarding the 
particular industry on whose board they sit, and even fewer have knowledge 
about the specific company on whose board they sit.”). 
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duties.263 Other times, they may become better informed by 
serving on multiple boards in the same industry, though this 
raises both fiduciary and antitrust concerns264 and overlooks 
alternative ways to recruit industry veterans.265 
Independent directors are, by definition, outsiders to the 
corporation. They work part-time, often sit on multiple boards, 
are not supported by a staff of their own, and receive their 
information from management.266 Proxy advisor voting 
guidelines only deem directors “overboarded”—and thus counsel 
revoking shareholder support in director elections—when they 
sit on five or more boards,267 despite the obvious risk of 
distraction from conscientious service on fewer boards. Modern 
corporate governance theory deems such directors best suited to 
monitor the corporation.268 However, with this outsider 
perspective come the natural limitations on an outsider’s ability 
 
 263. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 165 (“Corporate-governance scandals 
tend to confirm that many directors lack the knowledge and expertise to 
sufficiently appreciate the complexities associated with their business, and 
that such lack of knowledge impedes the effectiveness of their oversight.”). In 
principle, this problem could be addressed through outsourcing, though 
directors would still need a way to select and supervise outsourcing firms. See 
generally BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 66 (proposing outsourcing of 
governance functions typically performed or overseen by the board).  
 264. See Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1242 
(2020) (“If directors serve competitor companies, even under a broader 
definition of competition, they may facilitate coordination between 
competitors to the detriment of consumers.”).  
 265. See, e.g., Shill, supra note 163, at 1251 (describing the recruitment of 
expert independent directors through the use of supplemental compensation 
arrangements). 
 266. See id. at 1266 (“Even where no strong personal ties exist, structural 
features of independent-run boards, including independent directors’ minimal 
time investments and inferior access to information . . . .”); see also Kastiel & 
Nili, supra note 262, at 28 (“Independent directors are part-time employees 
who often sit on other boards or have other professional commitments, and 
thus cannot devote more than a few hours per month to their role as 
directors.”).  
 267. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/FBY9-XK8D (PDF) (setting forth proxy voting guidelines for 
directors serving on multiple boards).  
 268. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 130 (noting “overwhelming consensus” 
favoring the “dominat[ion]” of boards by independent directors).  
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to acquire information.269 Consequently, while they may bring 
industry experience or skills to the table, independent directors 
lack detailed intelligence on the firms they supervise, instead 
relying on insiders to supply the information upon which they 
will make decisions.270 This indirect reliance on insiders by 
definition weakens the potential of the independent board as a 
monitoring body.271 Managers often have the capability and 
incentive to filter and shape the presentation of information for 
director consumption.272 Absent outside resources, captured 
independent directors are susceptible to the same managerial 
self-interest and bias that it is their raison d’ être to counteract. 
 
* * * 
 
 269. See id. at 161 (“[T]he fact that independent directors are outsiders, 
and hence not engaged in the daily affairs of the corporation, means that they 
are dependent on the insiders that they must monitor to supply them with the 
information necessary to discharge their responsibilities.”).  
 270. See id.; Shill, supra note 163, at 1266 (“[S]tructural features of 
independent-run boards, including independent directors’ minimal time 
investments and inferior access to information, complicate the project of 
conducting meaningful oversight.”); Kastiel & Nili, supra note 262, at 27 (“In 
particular, the move toward board independence generated severe 
informational asymmetries between top executives and outside directors that 
limit the ability of the board to closely monitor such executives and to properly 
perform their role.”). 
 271. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. 
L. 447, 460 (2008) (“[T]hey rely on corporate officers and other employees for 
information and tend to defer to insiders’ management recommendations.”).   
 272. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 161 (“To the extent we are concerned 
that insiders may inappropriately filter or otherwise manipulate the 
information, independent directors may not alleviate this concern. This is 
because such directors’ outsider status makes it difficult for them to verify the 
accuracy of the information, and thus difficult to be effective monitors.”); Nili 
& Kastiel, supra note 262, at 27 
As a survey from 2007 demonstrates, only ten percent of directors 
were able to access the corporation’s information independently, 
through an online board portal. Therefore, the ability of an 
independent board to effectively monitor management and 
discharge their oversight responsibilities is based almost 
exclusively on the information obtained, screened, and then shared 
by management. 
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Directors nominated by activist shareholders are less 
vulnerable to some (though not all) of the above limitations.273 
Such directors—known as designated or activist 
directors— usually qualify as independent from the companies 
on whose boards they sit, but are less information-poor than 
other outside directors because they can call upon the assistance 
of staff at the fund that facilitated their appointment.274 
However, as a percentage of public company directors, 
designated directors are rare.275 
IV.  A Shield from Shareholders and Courts 
This Part examines the domains where the independent 
board is of the greatest utility to managers—namely, those 
where it makes transactions eligible for business judgment rule 
protection—few of which would be addressed by solutions 
proposed to date. 
“The trouble is,” as Stephen Bainbridge has written about 
the supervisory work of independent directors, “one can tell two 
radically different stories.”276 One version—the “faithful 
monitor” story—holds that “independent directors assiduously 
carry out their oversight obligations. In contrast,” a second 
version, the “rubberstamp” story, “claims that they are little 
more than management puppets.”277 This second version is the 
one Douglas was concerned about; he compared outside 
directors to “business colonels of the honorary type—honorary 
 
 273. See generally Shill, supra note 163. For example, concerns around 
structural bias may be lower for such directors since they are frequently added 
to the board following an adversarial engagement and serve shorter director 
terms, making it harder for ingroup loyalty to gel. See id. at 1274–86 
(discussing loyalty issues). However, they introduce other concerns, such as 
that of “dual loyalties.” Id.; see id. at 1296–99 (suggesting mechanisms to 
manage loyalty issues).  
 274. See id. at 1268 (“[T]hey are less vulnerable to information capture, 
because their nominating fund generally supplies them with briefing books 
analyzing company information prior to board meetings.”).  
 275. See, e.g., Melissa Sawyer et al., Review and Analysis of 2018 U.S. 
Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/P6DL-SEKV (detailing the number of board seats obtained by 
activists at U.S. issuers).  
 276. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1058. 
 277. Id.   
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colonels who are ornamental in parade but fairly useless in 
battle.”278 Both interpretations have explanatory value, and can 
even apply to the same board with respect to different topics or 
transactions.279 
In 1993, Bainbridge argued that this conundrum yielded an 
important question: “how closely should courts scrutinize 
decisions made by independent directors?”280 If such directors 
can be trusted to faithfully discharge their monitoring function, 
then a higher bar for judicial intervention can safely be set, 
since judges are hardly business experts and review would often 
be redundant at best.281 If, however, they are not so reliable, 
then the cost of broad deference may be higher.282 Bainbridge 
observed that the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance was ambivalent on the question of what 
impact the independent board should have on judicial review.283 
Indeed, this critical question remains open. 
This Article argues that the law makes it trivial for 
captured boards to preclude judicial review, and that this has 
immense consequences for the allocation of rights within the 
corporation as between shareholders and managers. This 
conclusion tracks the awkward position the independent board 
occupies as both monitor in chief (ensuring that firm interest is 
placed ahead of personal interest) and bulwark of efficiency 
(against shareholder and judicial claims that the monitoring 
function is not being fulfilled). 
This Part contends that for crucial transactions, Delaware 
law regarding the independent board counterintuitively locks in 
resistance to monitoring that places key actions effectively 
behind a shield. Part V, which follows, argues that changes in 
 
 278. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 46 (1940). 
 279. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1061 (“[T]he sticking point is that 
both stories have an element of truth.”). 
 280. Id. at 1068.  
 281. See id. at 1047 (“[S]ome [scholars] argued that that judicial review is 
at best redundant in light of the constraints on management already provided 
by market forces, and at worse might impede corporate efficiency.”).  
 282. See id. (“[S]ome argued that independent directors do not provide an 
effective check on management misconduct or, at least, that any constraints 
they provide are similarly redundant in the face of the market forces.”). 
 283. See id. at 1068–81.  
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market structure towards a stewardship role for mutual funds, 
activist investors, and proxy advisors clad managers in 
additional layers of armor, placing them beyond the reach of 
market discipline in important ways. 
A.  The Independent Board as Shield 
The business judgment rule itself operates as a potent 
shield by forcing critics of a company’s practices to take the Wall 
Street Walk, i.e., sell the stock. Ronald Gilson wrote that it 
“operates to bar courts from providing additional, and 
unnecessary, constraints on management decisions through 
judicial review of operating decisions.”284 But courts have 
recognized that judicial review is not automatically 
unnecessary, and thus not all decisions are automatically 
eligible for business judgment treatment.285 
Corporate policy decisions with the greatest salience to 
management—the determination of CEO pay,286 the adoption of 
takeover defenses that preserve incumbent managers’ jobs,287 
the decision to effectively block a shareholder lawsuit288 —and 
the highest potential for conflicts of interest can be made secure 
from judicial intervention only if they are approved by a 
corporation’s independent directors. The logic undergirding this 
adaptation of the business judgment rule is straightforward: the 
 
 284. Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981) 
(emphasis added). 
 285. See id.  
 286. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 
(Del. 2006) (considering whether a $130 million severance package paid to the 
president upon his termination was a breach of fiduciary duty and waste). 
 287. See generally Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 
1995) (assessing a challenge to defensive actions by a target corporation’s 
board of directors in a takeover contest); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time 
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (same); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (same). 
 288. Formation of a special litigation committee is a necessary 
intermediate step to receiving business judgment rule deference in the 
decision not to bring a derivative suit. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 
A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (stating that a special committee of independent, 
disinterested directors can obtain dismissal of a derivative suit if they 
determine that doing so is in the best interest of the corporation). 
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approval of independents provides assurance against 
self-dealing by managers, reducing the need for meaningful 
judicial review.289 But while it imposes an additional 
requirement on managers, it offers so much more in 
exchange— namely, foreclosure of the most damaging claims.290  
In this sense, the independent board structure now serves 
the same function for decisions implicating the duty of loyalty 
that the business judgment rule originally performed for the 
duty of care, and yields the same outcome: deference to 
managers, subject to procedural correctness.291 Both obvious 
conflicts of interest and penumbral ones—that is, transactions 
that implicate relationships that might not survive an 
independence determination292 —are cleansable via a vote of the 
independent directors. 
In exchange for the extraordinary immunity conferred by 
the independent board, corporations must make only modest 
concessions in their governance: a bare majority of formally 
independent directors (a restriction which in turn is defined 
narrowly), some independent committees, the appointment of a 
single financial expert to the audit committee, some additional 
reporting.293 The fact that business judgment immunity in 
high-risk transactions is conditioned on an approving vote of the 
company’s independents leaves dissenting shareholders with 
little opportunity to challenge such transactions other than to 
attack the “independentness” of the decision-making body, but 
 
 289. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 88 (“Although the business judgment 
rule comes into play with respect to [duties of care, good faith, and loyalty], it 
is most intimately associated with the duty of care.”).  
 290. See id. (“[I]f the business judgment rule does anything, it insulates 
directors from liability for negligence.”).  
 291. See id. at 88–89 (“The rule . . . [provides] a presumption that the 
directors or officers ‘of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith 
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.’” (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).  
 292. This category is meant to extend beyond the types of relationships 
that Sandys and Oracle held to constitute conflicts to embrace those that 
require extensive litigation to clear, such as in Disney.  
 293. Technically, the corporation may decline to appoint even a single 
director to the audit committee who is an “audit committee financial expert” 
within the meaning of SEC rules, but must then explain why. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 229.407(a) (2020). In practice, companies choose to appoint such experts. 
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plaintiffs bear the burden of showing lack of independence294 
and, in the absence of colorful facts295 or extensive business 
interconnections,296 such linkages between directors and 
executives can be hard to show. Even where managers are not 
obligated to accept all these impositions, such as in controlled 
companies,297 they often opt into the extraordinary privilege 
conferred by the independent model anyway.298 
B. Interaction with the Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule provides immunity for boards 
of directors for their substantive decisions regarding corporate 
policy so long as they have satisfied certain procedural 
minima.299 It constitutes a “‘presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”300 When 
 
 294. See infra Part IV.B–C.  
 295. See, e.g., Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 126 (Del. 2016) (holding that 
co-ownership of a private airplane by a CEO and an independent director 
created reasonable doubt as to whether the director was sufficiently 
independent for demand purposes). 
 296. See id. at 134 (“When . . . pled facts suggest such a [mutually 
beneficial ongoing business] relationship exists and the company’s own board 
has determined that the directors whose ability to consider a demand 
impartially is in question cannot be considered independent, a reasonable 
doubt exists . . . .”); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG, 
2018 WL 1381331, at *16–17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (highlighting the 
“multiple layers of business connections” that cast doubt on independence).  
 297. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, supra note 80; 
Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5615(c). “Smaller reporting 
companies,” which are generally issuers that have a public float of less than 
$75 million, are also exempt from independence requirements. See Listed 
Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, supra note 80; Nasdaq Stock Mkt. 
Rules, supra note 17, §§ 5605(d)(5), IM-5605-6. 
 298. Undoubtedly, one reason they do so is to head off criticism all public 
companies face from shareholders and their advocates. See infra Part V. 
 299. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“As for the 
plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to exercise ‘substantive due care,’ 
we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment 
rule . . . . Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”). 
 300. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) 
(quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)). 
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the rule is activated, decisions of the board become a black box 
that courts will not investigate.301 This reflects a policy choice 
that locates business decision authority on boards rather than 
with courts, given the strengths of boards relative to courts in 
that domain. Later court decisions, however, extend this choice 
to domains where that logic does not obviously apply, including 
in business decisions that raise questions about director and 
manager loyalty and conflicts of interest. Given the power of the 
rule to immunize board action, it is most consequential in these 
reaches of the sprawling kingdom of board authority, where 
approval by independent directors (acting as a group or on 
committees) is absolutely required but also virtually 
guaranteed. 
Decisions by an independent board are “entitled to certain 
beneficial presumptions,”302 and the application of the business 
judgment rule in contentious cases—those implicating the duty 
of loyalty—rests on a foundation of board independence.303 
Where conflicts are present, the approval of independent 
directors is a precondition to cleansing: independence “inheres 
in the [very] conception and rationale of the business judgment 
rule. The presumption of propriety that flows from an exercise 
of business judgment is based in part on this unyielding 
precept.”304 Given the sweeping universe of transactions for 
which independent director sanction is necessary to business 
judgment immunity, it is fair to say the independent board 
 
 301. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“In 
a purely business corporation . . . the authority of the directors in the conduct 
of the business of the corporation must be regarded as absolute when they act 
within the law, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment 
for that of the directors.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Helfman 
v. Am. Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540, 550 (N.J. Ch. 1936))). 
 302. Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the 
Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 35 (1987). 
 303. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984), overruled on 
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (stating that 
independence presumes that a director will base his decisions on the 
“corporate merits of the subject”).  
 304. Id.  
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supercharges the rule, especially in the most sensitive cases. It 
may even substitute for regulation.305 
An examination of the rationale behind the business 
judgment rule underscores both the theoretical and practical 
significance of independence. Courts have said repeatedly that 
they do not wish to involve themselves in business decisions, a 
choice that, “at least in part, is grounded in the prudent 
recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called 
on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business 
judgments.”306 Thus, the rationale for judicial abstention is 
strongest for what are “essentially business judgments,” such as 
a choice between plowing profits back into the business and 
returning them to shareholders via a dividend.307 These 
implicate the duty of care. In another class of cases—those 
implicating the interests of managers and directors, and thus 
the duty of loyalty—the comparative competence of 
businesspeople does not have any special bearing.308 The notion 
that the board is the right place to cleanse duty of loyalty 
problems on the board is a category error. As advocated in Part 
VI, infra, courts are not only competent to adjudicate conflict 
transactions but well positioned to do so. 
 
 305. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 131 (“[T]he installation of independent 
directors serves as a substitute for external regulation, particularly with 
respect to ‘high risk’ transactions.”). Previous commentators have emphasized 
the inadequacy of independence as a substitute for regulation to achieve public 
ends. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 83, at 859–61 (positing that the embrace 
of independent directors by institutional investors and managers, “in the 
absence of evidence that it improves corporate performance or reduces 
wrongdoing,” can be explained as a strategic choice favoring “marginal 
decreases in corporate performance [in exchange] for the reduced risk of 
costlier substantive regulation”). 
 306. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979). 
 307. See generally Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
While the holding in this case intruded on this very choice, it is generally 
taught as an example of a decision that would be difficult to justify on its stated 
reasoning today following the ascent of the business judgment rule. 
 308. See, e.g., Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927) 
(“If in the particular case there is nothing to show that the directors did not 
exercise their discretion for what they believed to be the best interest of the 
corporation, certainly an honest mistake of business judgment should not be 
reviewable by the Court.”) 
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The independent board can only offer enhanced legal 
immunity if the requirements of the business judgment rule are 
first satisfied. To render themselves eligible for protection, 
directors must discharge their duties of care and loyalty to the 
corporation.309 Under Delaware law, their acts presumptively 
satisfy this standard.310 To defeat this presumption, 
shareholder-plaintiffs must show that directors breached their 
fiduciary duties of loyalty or care.311 Precise formulations vary 
among jurisdictions and courts within them; in general, courts 
“will not interfere with [boards’] discretion unless it be first 
made to appear that the directors have acted or are about to act 
in bad faith and for a dishonest purpose,”312 both of which are 
difficult to prove. If the shareholder cannot meet this showing, 
“the business judgment rule attaches to protect corporate 
officers and directors and the decisions they make, 
and . . . courts will not second-guess these business 
judgments.”313 This standard sets a high bar to shareholder 
 
 309. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 
1993); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (defining the duty of 
loyalty as a ban on officers and directors using “their position of trust and 
confidence to further their private interests”). 
 310. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 
(Del. 2003) (“The business judgment rule is a ‘presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in 
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.’” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))).  
 311. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (Del. 1993) (discussing a duty of good 
faith as part of directors’ fiduciary duties, which is now regarded as part of the 
duty of loyalty), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
 312. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (Sup. Ct. 1976) 
(quoting Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 150 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1926)), aff’d, 387 
N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976); accord Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 927 
(observing that “[t]he business judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, 
is a common-law recognition of the statutory authority to manage a 
corporation that is vested in the board of directors” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 
2003))). 
 313. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (stating the law for Delaware). The 
business judgment rule operates in similar fashion in other states. 
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challenges of board decisions, elevated further by the doctrine 
around the independent board.314 
The business judgment rule operates like a judicial 
abstention doctrine.315 If the shareholder fails to carry her 
burden, the business judgment rule “operates to protect the 
individual director-defendants from personal liability for 
making the board decision at issue.”316 The rationale is that 
courts wish to avoid “apply[ing] 20/20 hindsight to second guess 
a board’s decision, except ‘in rare cases [where] a transaction 
may be so egregious on its face that the board approval cannot 
meet the test of business judgment.’”317 The business judgment 
rule standard is closer to gross negligence than “substantive due 
care” or “reasonableness.”318 Once the fiduciary duty boxes have 
been checked, courts draw a curtain across the directors’ 
conduct that forecloses further judicial review.319 
The roots of the business judgment rule lie in the logic of 
comparative advantage. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has 
explained, the rule “insulates most decisions from judicial 
review because there is little likelihood that systematic judicial 
intervention would make investors better off.”320 Judges, after 
all, “are not selected for business acumen and are not penalized 
 
 314. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of 
Directors in American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 317, 331–32 
(1998) (discussing the rare success of plaintiffs in duty of care cases and the 
reluctance of courts to interfere with business judgment decisions absent a 
showing of negligence).   
 315. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see generally 
Bainbridge, supra note 1. 
 316. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000) (citing Cede & Co., 
634 A.2d at 361). 
 317. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 260 (Del. 2000) (alteration in original) 
(quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 
1998)). 
 318. See id. at 264 (expressly rejecting the “substantive due care” 
formulation and noting that the court “do[es] not even decide if [business 
decisions] are reasonable in this context”). 
 319. See id. at 266 (articulating a narrow standard for judicial review of 
board decisions, stating that the alternative “would invite courts to become 
super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business decisionmaking and 
executive compensation”).  
 320. Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 
75 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 984 (1987). 
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for bad decisions.”321 Giving courts more power over the daily 
workings of corporations would “increase the riskiness of 
business decisions without making decisions better.”322 This 
explains why the business judgment rule insulates corporate 
decisions implicating the duty of care, but cannot explain why it 
extends to decisions implicating the duty of loyalty. 
The key difference between the application of the business 
judgment rule in claims implicating the duty of care versus the 
duty of loyalty is that the latter group requires the approval of 
a body of independent directors, whether a committee or the full 
board. In a duty of care case, unless the procedural presumption 
of the business judgment rule is rebutted, a court will not 
scrutinize the judgment of the board so long as the board’s 
decision can be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”323 
This has the effect of precluding duty of care claims except in 
the most extreme circumstances. On top of these protections for 
conduct implicating the duty of care, Section 102(b)(7) 
exculpatory provisions,324 indemnification,325 and insurance also 
shield directors from personal liability for violations of the duty 
of care.326 Insurance provides a personal liability shield that can 
outlive even the firm itself. 
The combined effect of the independent board and the 
business judgment rule is to make this same immunity 
available to managers in transactions implicating the duty of 
loyalty. Approving votes of independents can cure what might 
 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); see 
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (noting 
that the business judgment rule is “powerful because it operates deferentially” 
and that a court will not “substitute its judgment” as long as the action in 
question bears a relation to “any rational business purpose” (citing Unitrin, 
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))). 
 324. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020). 
 325. See E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a 
Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 
BUS. LAW. 399, 404 (1987) (discussing the role of indemnification, as 
authorized by § 145 of the DGCL, in protecting directors).  
 326. See id. at 417 (stating that insurance covering directors fills the gap 
where indemnification is unavailable, thereby providing fuller protection 
against liability).  
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otherwise be loyalty violations by CEOs. These apply to 
takeover offers, CEO pay, derivative litigation, and other 
conflict transactions discussed in the next subpart. 
C.  A Shield for CEOs and Other Executives 
The independent board has the power to confer business 
judgment protection even on those transactions that present 
severe conflicts of interest. To do so, it must secure approval of 
independent directors, acting either as a majority of the board 
or as the sole members of a committee, who are meant to stand 
in for shareholder interests. Bainbridge has cited this division 
of labor approvingly as an example of judicial recognition of the 
superior position of boards in corporate law, above courts.327 The 
experience, however, of independent directors—who are deeply 
influenced by managers328 —suggests additional scrutiny of this 
process is warranted. This subpart examines the relevance of 
independent directors for board actions that present elevated 
risks of manager opportunism at the expense of shareholders. 
1.  Defensive Measures and Deal Protections 
Public firms frequently acquire other firms or are 
themselves the target of takeover bids in the market for 
corporate control. The takeover market is meant to provide an 
essential check on managers: as articulated in its classic form 
by Henry Manne and later elaborated by Eugene Fama and 
Michael Jensen, companies that do not perform well see a 
decline in their market capitalization, which facilitates their 
own takeover by other, stronger firms.329 For managers and 
directors of firms that are the target of tender offers and other 
takeover measures, however, the benefits to the shareholders of 
creative destruction may not be front of mind. When a company 
is acquired, the old business ceases to exist as an independent 
 
 327. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1068–81. 
 328. See supra Part III. 
 329. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 
73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965); see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. 
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313–14 
(1983) (contending that “the takeover market provides an external court of last 
resort for protection of residual claimants,” i.e., shareholders). 
Shill.ICErecon (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:06 PM 
THE INDEPENDENT BOARD AS SHIELD 1873 
 
entity.330 Its board and management are customarily reshuffled 
through a mix of dismissals and demotions.331 Thus, while they 
are obligated to act in the best interest of the corporation, both 
managers and directors tend to worry about the loss of pay, 
prestige, and power that often attends a merger into another 
firm.332 On the other hand, when they receive an offer they find 
attractive, they may want to protect that offer even as they take 
soundings for higher bids.333 Boards and their advisors have 
developed several mechanisms to take control of the deal 
process that complicates the free market theory of corporate 
control. The two most common categories of devices are 
defensive measures and deal protections, and in both cases, 
courts have held that the independent board precludes serious 
judicial review. 
The poison pill, the premier defensive measure, allows 
boards to block tender offers outright.334 True to their name, 
poison pills are intended to deter unsolicited bids by making 
acquisitions of a large percentage of the firm’s equity 
economically suicidal for the acquirer: once a threshold is 
crossed, the pill is triggered and huge discounts are offered to 
 
 330. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977) (“A 
merger, however, involves the actual absorption of one corporation into 
another, with the former losing its existence as a separate corporate entity.”). 
 331. See Nicholas J. Price, What Happens to a Company’s Existing Board 
During a Merger?, DILIGENT INSIGHTS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/D354-
RQ8M (describing the process of board reconfiguration at the end of a merger).  
 332. See id. (“[M]ergers trigger uncertainty and ambiguity throughout the 
organization. The uncertainties cause a drop in the trust level. It’s common for 
all or most board directors, managers and other employees to go into 
self-preservation mode.”). 
 333. See Albert O. “Chip” Saulsbury, IV, The Availability of Takeover 
Defenses and Deal Protection Devices for Anglo-American Target Companies, 
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 115, 147 (2012) (“Target companies utilize deal protection 
devices to reduce the risk of withdrawal of a favorable offer to purchase the 
company. Directors may also use these provisions as leverage to negotiate a 
higher purchase price, which results in a greater premium for the company’s 
shareholders.”). 
 334. See, e.g., Chase deKay Wilson, Marty Lipton’s Poison Pill, 3 INT’L FIN. 
L. REV. 10, 10 (1984) (discussing the role of Wachtell Lipton in formulating the 
poison pill); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a 
Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1568 (2014) 
(discussing the status of the poison pill under state law as it interacts with 
various sources of federal law). 
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every other shareholder to buy stock in the firm.335 This 
operates as discrimination against one bidder—the first to cross 
the threshold—in favor of all other shareholders.336 Boards can 
also adopt poison pills that “just say no” to any bid.337 
Deal protections are meant to allow boards to encourage or 
protect an offer from a particular bidder. These include no-shop 
clauses, matching rights, and, very commonly, termination fees, 
which “operate to deter competing bids by impeding subsequent 
bidders from topping a favored bidder with a more attractive 
offer.”338 As a matter of law, boards adopting them face less 
scrutiny if their intention is to increase value for shareholders, 
but when they contain personal benefits for the target board or 
C-suite—such as continued board or executive service in the 
merged entity—they spark a more searching review.339 
While both defensive measures and deal protections face 
the possibility of invalidation by Delaware courts, independent 
boards can successfully deploy and defend them in practice. A 
pair of Delaware Supreme Court cases from the mid-1980s 
establish the fiduciary obligations of the target board in mergers 
 
 335. See Wilson, supra note 334, at 10–11. 
 336. See Matt Levine, Don’t Eat the Poison Pill by Mistake, BLOOMBERG 
OP. (July 25, 2018, 11:02 AM) https://perma.cc/DV2K-WT2M   
[T]he way poison pills work is . . . just sort of unbelievable. 
Basically, if anyone triggers the pill—if they go over 10 or 20 or 31 
percent of the stock or whatever the trigger is—then every other 
shareholder of the company gets offered the right to buy a ton of the 
company’s stock at a big discount. If people exercise these 
rights— and they should because they offer the chance to buy stock 
at a big discount—then many more shares are issued and the 
triggering shareholder is massively diluted . . . . It just sort of 
seems like this shouldn’t be allowed, that companies shouldn’t be 
able to give massively discounted shares to all of their shareholders 
except the one they don’t like. 
 337. See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355–57 (Del. 
1985) (upholding a shareholder rights plan (a.k.a., “poison pill”) as a legitimate 
exercise of business judgment by the target company’s board). 
 338. Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 171 & nn.34–36. 
 339. See id. (discussing the fact that transactions that contain inherent 
conflicts of interest—such as a sale of control or the adoption of deal protection 
devices—will be subjected to a higher scrutiny because the nature of those 
transactions might tempt even the most independent or disinterested 
director). 
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and acquisitions.340 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.341 obligates directors of a board selling the firm 
to pursue the highest deal value available, which subjects any 
defensive measures such as poison pills to enhanced scrutiny 
review.342 The other case, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,343 
develops and applies the enhanced scrutiny standard in the 
context of defensive measures.344 The two cases govern 
Delaware courts’ review of deal protections as well.345 Unocal 
concludes that enhanced scrutiny applies unless directors 
adopted measures that were both (1) “in good faith and upon a 
reasonable investigation pursuant to a clear duty to protect the 
corporate enterprise” and (2) “reasonable in relation to the 
threat that the board rationally and reasonably believed was 
posed” by an “inadequate and coercive” tender offer.346 If the 
measure does satisfy those requirements, however, it will 
 
 340. See id. at 170 (observing that with regard to defensive measures and 
deal protections, “deference to the board [via the business judgment rule] is 
unwarranted. Without actual conflict, however, the entire fairness review 
would be too stringent”).  
 341. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).  
 342. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 
(Del. 1994) (stating that enhanced scrutiny applies to “(1) the approval of a 
transaction resulting in a sale of control, and (2) the adoption of defensive 
measures in response to a threat to corporate control”); see also Anabtawi, 
supra note 50, at 170 & n.31 (“In an M&A transaction negotiated by a 
company’s board of directors, the specific contexts that give rise to enhanced 
scrutiny are the sale of control of the company or entering into deal protection 
devices.” (citing Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period 
of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2003))). 
 343. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 344. See id. at 954–55 (recognizing that in the face of a possible takeover 
bid, directors of a corporation are necessarily faced with a conflict of 
interest— i.e., their fiduciary duty to shareholders on one hand and the 
prospect of losing their jobs on the other—that requires judicial oversight). 
 345. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side 
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 319 (2000) 
(“Uncomfortable with either extreme in the takeover context, the Delaware 
Supreme Court set up new standards of ‘intermediate’ review in two landmark 
cases in the mid-1980s—Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, and Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.—each of which bears on the legality 
of lockups.”). 
 346. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958. 
Shill.ICErecon (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:06 PM 
1876 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1811 (2020) 
 
receive business judgment deference.347 In Unocal itself, the 
court provided a road map to that goal: a showing necessary to 
satisfy the first prong (good faith and reasonableness) “is 
materially enhanced, as here, by the approval of a board 
comprised of a majority of outside independent directors.”348 
That is to say, the court considers evidence of reasonableness 
and good faith to be materially more credible when independent 
directors approved of the challenged transaction.349 
The erosion or “twilight” of enhanced scrutiny350 was thus 
perhaps foreordained. Officially, the enhanced scrutiny 
standard sits on a continuum between the business judgment 
rule’s extreme deference at one end and the more exacting 
standard of entire fairness review (requiring “judicial scrutiny 
of the substance of business transactions for objective fairness 
of both price and process”) at the other.351 After all, as Delaware 
courts have acknowledged, “the realities of the decision-making 
context can subtly undermine the decisions of even independent 
and disinterested directors,”352 necessitating this intermediate 
level of review. In practice, however, the independent board has 
rendered enhanced scrutiny closer to the simple business 
judgment standard. 
 
 347. See id. (stating that because the board’s action in undertaking a 
selective stock exchange was made “in good faith and upon reasonable 
investigation” and was “reasonable in relation to the threat that the board 
rationally and reasonably believed was posed by [the bidder’s] inadequate and 
coercive two-tier tender offer,” it was “entitled to be measured by the 
standards of the business judgement rule”). 
 348. Id. at 955 (emphasis added). 
 349. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) 
(“Moreover, that proof is materially enhanced, as we noted in Unocal, where, 
as here, a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside 
independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing 
standards.”(citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
812 (Del. 1984))). 
 350. See Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 210 (concluding that the heightened 
fiduciary duty standards for M&A transactions initially introduced by the 
Delaware courts have given way to more judicial deference to board decisions). 
 351. See id. at 170 (“The enhanced scrutiny standard applies in contexts 
that make it plausible to infer that a board is making a decision in the face of 
dueling loyalties to both its own interests and those of the company’s 
stockholders.”). 
 352. Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
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Delaware courts conducting a Revlon review now apply a 
“more deferential” standard to defensive measures.353 They ask: 
“Did the board act in bad faith in pursuing a sale by willfully 
disregarding its duty to obtain maximum value for the target 
shareholders?”354 Framing it this way makes decisions hard to 
review. Specifically, as Iman Anabtawi has explained, this 
query collapses Revlon duties into the analysis of directors’ 
adherence to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, which are 
the preconditions for the application of the simple business 
judgment rule.355 This makes judicial review of defensive 
measures more akin to stock-for-stock deals. The independent 
board exempts such deals from Revlon treatment, unless a 
majority of the board is insufficiently disinterested and 
independent.356 
The Delaware courts have likewise effectively shut 
enhanced scrutiny out of deal protection review, as the Unocal 
court invited them to do.357 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Time Inc.,358 and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.359 are 
leading examples—specifically with respect to Unocal’s first 
prong, which requires that the board exercise good faith and 
reasonable investigation before deciding that the challenged 
measures are warranted.360 In Paramount, the court concluded 
that the target’s decision not to negotiate with a bidder “cannot 
 
 353. See Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 172 (“The standards of review 
articulated in both Revlon and Unocal have been diluted judicially over 
time.”).  
 354. Id. (emphasis added). 
 355. See id. (“More recently, however, Revlon duties have been subsumed 
into the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.” (quoting In re 
Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1175 (Del. 
2015))). 
 356. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 363 (Del. Ch. 
2008) (defining this circumstance as “a majority of the board suffers from a 
disabling interest or lack of independence” or the board is dominated by 
directors who have a “material and disabling interest”). 
 357. See Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 172 (“The Delaware courts have also 
eroded the Unocal standard of review, which the courts use to police 
over-reaching deal protection measures.”).  
 358. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 359. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 360. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).  
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be fairly found to have been uninformed” under the first 
prong.361 It stated that “[t]he evidence supporting this finding is 
materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of [the target’s] 
sixteen board members were outside independent directors.”362 
The court in Unitrin emphasized the same point: Unocal’s first 
prong required the board to show that, “after a reasonable 
investigation, it determined in good faith, that [bidder’s offer] 
presented a threat to [the target] that warranted a defensive 
response,” and “the presence of a majority of outside 
independent directors will materially enhance such 
evidence.”363 Both cases cite to the invitation in Unocal to use 
independent directors to bolster the case for immunizing the 
decision via business judgment review.364 As to the Unocal 
standard of good faith and reasonable investigation, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has determined that the approval of 
independent directors, informed by financial and legal advice, is 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case.365  
Reflecting on these decisions, “many commentators now 
believe that Unocal no longer provides the same level of 
enhanced review [for deal protection measures] that it once 
promised.”366 Some proposals urge a modest broadening of the 
universe of transactions understood to trigger enhanced 
scrutiny,367 but would continue the independent board’s central 
 
 361. Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1154. 
 362. Id. (emphasis added). 
 363. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375. 
 364. See id. (“This Court has held that the presence of a majority of outside 
independent directors will materially enhance such evidence.”); Paramount 
Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1154 (“The evidence supporting this finding is 
materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of [the target’s] sixteen board 
members were outside independent directors.”). 
 365. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (“Here, the presence 
of the 10 outside directors on the Texaco board, coupled with the advice 
rendered by the investment banker and legal counsel, constitute a prima 
facie showing of good faith and reasonable investigation.”). 
 366. Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 173. Observations in the same vein were 
made closer to the time as well. See generally Pease, supra note 302. 
 367. See, e.g., Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of 
Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1069 (2017) (advocating for the 
application of the deal protection doctrine to provisions that have a deal 
protection effect even if “they might have some colorable business purpose” as 
well). 
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role.368 Thus, a “principal impact of Unocal” remains the way it 
“shifts the locus of power from the board at large, not to the 
shareholders or to the court, but rather to the independent 
directors.”369 Delaware courts, in an effort to provide greater 
shareholder supervision of deal protection via the independent 
board, placed too much weight on that structure.370 
2.  Executive Compensation 
Executive compensation is a high-priority topic for 
managers. In recognition of the potential for managers to use 
the mechanisms detailed in Part III to inflate their pay, 
Delaware courts and the market have evolved special 
procedures for boards to follow to increase the likelihood that 
executive compensation plans will receive business judgment 
protection, and thus immunity from judicial review. 
The blueprint for the independent board to shield executive 
compensation is inscribed in Delaware precedents upholding 
the severance payment the Walt Disney Company made to its 
ex-chief Michael Ovitz.371 In October 1995, Ovitz joined Disney 
from a successful talent partnership, where he had an annual 
income exceeding $20 million and an equity stake.372 He 
founded the partnership and owned a majority stake in it, and 
would only agree to give that up for the Disney job if he received 
“downside protection” in exchange.373 His Disney employment 
agreement guaranteed him minimum compensation amounting 
 
 368. See id. at 1052 (explaining Unocal’s framework without questioning 
its efficacy). 
 369. Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme 
Court’s Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 587−88 (1994). 
 370. See id. at 590 (stating that the shareholders’ ability to elect and 
remove the independent board provides a sufficient balance of power such that 
courts do not have to engage in substantive review of board decisions). 
 371. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. 
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
 372. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 36−37 (Del. 
2006). 
 373. Id. at 37. 
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to around $24 million per year even in the event he was 
terminated early.374 
Though Ovitz’s arrival was greeted with great 
enthusiasm—Disney’s stock price increased 4.4 percent on the 
news, adding $1 billion to its market value375—within about a 
year it became clear that “Ovitz was a poor fit with his fellow 
executives.”376 By fall 1996, the board was discussing the 
deterioration in the relationship between Ovitz and Disney, and 
was moving towards a dismissal.377 Fourteen months after he 
was hired, Ovitz was terminated.378 His employment agreement 
contained a provision that relieved Disney of the obligation to 
make a termination payment if he was fired “for cause,” but the 
company was unable to find reason to activate that clause.379 
Accordingly, when Ovitz was terminated, he received a full 
“golden parachute” severance payment of $130 million.380 This 
figure consisted of $38.5 million in cash (of which the board’s 
compensation committee had prior knowledge) and about $91.5 
million in options (as to which the knowledge picture was less 
clear).381  
The litigation centered on whether the hiring and firing of 
Ovitz was reasonable, given among other things the size of the 
severance payment.382 In examining this question, the court 
found it critical that a board of independent directors had 
approved Ovitz’s contract.383 Earlier challenges focused on 
alleged deficiencies in the independence of each Disney director, 
 
 374. Id. at 37−38, 38 n.9. For tax and other reasons, the plan was later 
revised somewhat. See id. at 38−41 (detailing the negotiations and 
agreement). 
 375. Id. at 40. 
 376. Id. at 41−42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 377. Id. at 42. 
 378. Id. at 35. 
 379. Id. at 43−44. 
 380. Id. at 35. 
 381. Id. at 57. 
 382. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 277−78 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that the complaint alleges that the directors did 
not exercise due care in deciding to hire and fire Ovitz). 
 383. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760 (Del. 
Ch. 2005) (applying the business judgment rule), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
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but these were unsuccessful;384 at one point, a court examined 
whether the former CEO, Michael Eisner, might have a biasing 
interest in the Ovitz contract, but concluded he did not.385 These 
were important findings, since, as the Chancery court 
explained, Eisner had “stacked” the board “with friends and 
other acquaintances who, though not necessarily beholden to 
him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing to accede to his 
wishes and support him unconditionally than truly independent 
directors.”386 Nevertheless, because Ovitz’s employment 
agreement—including the severance package—had been 
approved by a board of independent directors who met the 
narrow formal legal definitions of independence and 
disinterestedness, and was concluded upon the advice of a 
compensation consultant, the Supreme Court held that the 
business judgment rule attached to the decisions to hire and fire 
him, and thus to the payment of $130 million.387 Specifically, 
these decisions constituted “protected business judgments, made 
without any violations of [the independent directors’] fiduciary 
duty,” and as such they were shielded from shareholder 
challenge.388 
The size of the severance in Disney is unusual, but that 
decision’s reliance on the independent board to immunize 
executive compensation transactions is now canonical and 
common. Rather than exploring more deeply limitations of the 
independent board detailed in Part III, supra, Delaware courts 
 
 384. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361 (Del. 
Ch. 1998) (“[T]en of the fifteen directors who approved the Agreement and 
eleven of the sixteen who voted to honor the Agreement were independent in 
deciding the issues.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 385. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 258 (Del. 2000) (affirming the 
lower court’s ruling as to Eisner’s alleged bias). To be precise, the court held 
the plaintiffs failed to create reasonable doubt about whether he had such an 
interest. Id. 
 386. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 760. 
 387. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73 (Del. 
2006). 
 388. Id. (emphasis added). The court also rejected plaintiffs’ waste claim. 
Id. at 75. 
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police the boundaries of the rule.389 For example, the Chancery 
court in Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!390 observed of executive 
compensation plans that “a board cannot mindlessly swallow 
information” from third parties (such as compensation 
consultants), and must instead “exercise its own business 
judgment in approving an executive compensation 
transaction.”391 Another Chancery decision, Friedman v. 
Dolan,392 explained that courts reviewing executive 
compensation decisions “typically defer[] to the business 
judgment of independent directors making compensation 
decisions.”393 Absent a breach of fiduciary duty, courts have 
“declined to scrutinize mere acceptance of compensation 
determined by an independent board or committee.”394 
In sum, the determination of executive pay is presumed 
proper and entitled to business judgment deference when it is 
made by formally independent outsiders whom the executives 
are widely acknowledged to influence. Courts ostensibly address 
the problems inherent in that process by interrogating directors’ 
independent status, which tends to confirm the central role of 
independence in shielding manager decisions. 
3. Derivative Litigation and Special Litigation Committees 
When a shareholder believes the corporation has a legal 
claim against a director or officer, she can bring a derivative suit 
with the goal of triggering a lawsuit by the corporation against 
that party (or, more realistically, a settlement). Claims over 
Ovitz’s contract in Disney fit this definition, as does the bulk of 
shareholder litigation. 
 
 389. See id. at 172 (stating that Delaware courts use the Unocal standard 
to “police over-reaching deal protection measures”). 
 390. 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by Tiger v. 
Boast Apparel, Inc., 214 A.3d 933 (Del. 2019). 
 391. Id. at 783 
 392. No. CV 9425, 2015 WL 4040806 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015). 
 393. Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
 394. Id. (footnote call omitted). 
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Since the claim belongs to the corporation and not the 
plaintiff, the board is entitled to weigh in on it.395 The procedure 
to inform the board is known as a litigation demand, made by 
the plaintiff upon the board.396 To evaluate the merits of the 
demand, the board must be independent as to the demand,397 
i.e., the directors must lack a personal interest in the 
litigation.398 The directors are presumed independent at this 
stage, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that 
reasonable doubt exists as to the independence of a majority of 
the directors.399 If the plaintiff carries that burden, then the 
demand requirement is excused.400 The board at that stage will 
commonly constitute a committee of independent directors, 
typically called a special litigation committee, to consider the 
suit.401 Their member-directors must be independent (under 
Delaware law) to perform this cleansing function, and bear the 
burden of showing it.402 The determination of whether a demand 
 
 395. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004) (stating that a 
plaintiff must make a demand of the directors that they pursue litigation 
before she can pursue a derivative suit unless that demand is excused under 
the Aronson standard). 
 396. See id.  
 397. See id. (stating that demand is excused if the directors are “deemed 
incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the pursuit of the 
litigation”). 
 398. See id. at 1049 (“A director will be considered unable to act objectively 
with respect to a presuit demand if he or she is interested in the outcome of 
the litigation or is otherwise not independent.”). 
 399. See id. at 1048−49 (“[T]he directors are entitled to a presumption that 
they were faithful to their fiduciary duties. In the context of a presuit demand, 
the burden is upon the plaintiff in a derivative action to overcome that 
presumption.”).  
 400. See id. at 1049 (“If the Court determines that the pleaded facts create 
a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board could have acted 
independently in responding to the demand, the presumption is rebutted for 
pleading purposes and demand will be excused as futile.”). 
 401. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 923 (Del. 
Ch. 2003) (describing the board’s formation of a special litigation committee); 
Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (introducing the special 
litigation committee procedure). An entire literature exists on the use and 
procedural mechanics of special committees, which will not be plumbed here. 
 402. See In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 937 (“I begin with an important 
reminder: the SLC bears the burden of proving its independence. It must 
convince me.”). 
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must be made turns on the independent status of the members 
of the board.403 
As in the examples of mergers and executive compensation, 
corporate law’s reliance on captured independent directors 
empowers managers to shield their own conduct in the 
highest-salience cases because independence triggers the 
application of business judgment immunity. As the Delaware 
Supreme Court said in the 1984 case Aronson v. Lewis,404 “[t]he 
requirement of director independence [in considering litigation 
demands] inher[e]s in the conception and rationale of the 
business judgment rule. The presumption of propriety that 
flows from an exercise of business judgment is based in part on 
this unyielding precept.”405 
The independence-business judgment nexus is critical. The 
court explained: independence signifies “that a director’s 
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before 
the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences,” 
and must reflect each director bringing her “own informed 
business judgment to bear with specificity upon the corporate 
merits of the issues without regard for or succumbing to 
influences which convert an otherwise valid business decision 
into a faithless act.”406 At the same time, it gave a sense of how 
difficult it would be for plaintiffs to show that a director had 
fallen short on independence.407 For example, the court stated 
that it was not enough to show that a director had been installed 
directly or indirectly by a controlling shareholder, for the simple 
reason that (at that time) “[t]hat is the usual way a person 
 
 403. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1048 (stating that demand is excused if the 
directors are “deemed incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the 
pursuit of the litigation”). 
 404. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 405. Id. at 816. 
 406. Id. 
 407. See id. (“The shorthand shibboleth of ‘dominated and controlled 
directors’ is insufficient.”). 
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becomes a corporate director.”408 It has scarcely become easier 
to challenge the independent status of a director.409 
This process is now well established. By 1993, “courts both 
in and out of Delaware ha[d] ruled with near unanimity . . . that 
the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of 
judicial review” where a majority of independents on the board 
decide to quash a derivative suit.410 In practice, this means a 
captured board can shield managers with impunity. While one 
empirical study found that special litigation committees often 
recommend pursuit or settlement rather than dismissal of 
derivative suits,411 another found that no special litigation 
committee “ha[d] ever recommended that derivative litigation 
continue against sitting directors . . . .”412 Even the former 
finding is consistent with the independent board functioning as 
a shield: it provides managers with a way to resolve disputes 
against them expeditiously and with less fanfare, and the merits 
of the decisions to do so—once insulated by the independence 
board—receive business judgment immunity. 
4.  Management Buyouts 
Acquisitions by managers of Delaware corporations they 
run trigger an elaborate review procedure.413 In common with 
the corporate governance mechanisms described above, the 
availability of business judgment protection for a management 
 
 408. Id. 
 409. See supra Parts II–III. One arguable exception is where a controlling 
shareholder is present, but for reasons discussed in Part II.B.1, it is unclear 
whether new precedents in that area can be extended to non-controller cases. 
 410. Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the 
American Law Institute, 48 BUS. LAW. 1443, 1443−44 (1993). The conclusion 
boards formally reach is that a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation will not 
serve the corporation’s best interests. 
 411. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation 
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1320 (2009) (“Over 
forty percent of the time the SLC [special litigation committee] either settled 
or pursued one or more claims against one or more defendants.”). 
 412. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING 
CORPORATE LAW 524 (4th ed. 2013). 
 413. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) 
(stating that the entire fairness standard, which is “the highest standard of 
review in corporate law[,]” usually applies to such mergers).  
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buyout (MBO) is conditioned on the use of independent 
directors.414 Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.,415 known as MFW, 
sets forth the conditions under which a board’s MBO process 
“qualif[ies] to be given cleansing credit under the business 
judgment rule.”416 This process consists of two requirements: 
approval by (1) an independent special committee of the board 
convened for the purpose of evaluating the transaction, and (2) 
a majority of the minority (non-controlling) shareholders.417 The 
Delaware Supreme Court has described “the central objective” 
of MFW as being “to provide an incentive for controllers to 
embrace the procedural approach most favorable to minority 
investors, with the incentive of obtaining the protection of the 
business judgment rule standard of review.”418 Independent 
directors are a necessary precondition419 for an MBO 
 
 414. See id. (stating that the controller must “irrevocably and publicly 
disables itself from using its control to dictate the outcome of the negotiations” 
for the transaction to be eligible for business judgment protection). 
 415. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
 416. In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 496, 501 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
In addition, while discussion of DGCL § 144 is reserved for Part IV.C.5, there 
is some possibility that that provision provides an additional mechanism of 
insulation for management buyouts. See, e.g., Tuch, supra note 30, at 951−58, 
981−82 (discussing the protection provided by § 144 in self-dealing 
transactions); Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1285, 1308 (2016) (explaining that the business judgment rule does not 
apply in conflict-of-interest transactions); Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process 
Design in Management Buyouts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 650 (2016) (describing 
standards of review for MBOs under MFW and § 144); Matthew D. Cain & 
Steven M. Davidoff (now Davidoff Solomon), Form Over Substance? The Value 
of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 
874– 76 (2011). 
 417. See M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644 (setting forth the standard of 
review). 
 418. Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 756 (Del. 2018). 
 419. The full set of conditions was ably summarized in another Chancery 
case. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Volgenau, No. CV 6354, 2013 WL 4009193, 
at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2013)  
The [MFW] Court held that the business judgment rule could apply 
if all of the following conditions were satisfied: (1) the controlling 
stockholder at the outset conditions the transaction on the approval 
of both a special committee and a non-waivable vote of a majority 
of the minority investors; (2) the special committee was 
independent, (3) fully empowered to negotiate the transaction, or to 
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transaction to “qualify to be given cleansing credit under the 
business judgment rule.”420 The underlying theory is that 
independence and other aspects of the process “had the effect of 
replicating an arms’ length transaction,” and thus “they had a 
‘cleansing’ effect on the transaction that justified judicial review 
under the deferential business judgment rule.”421 Specifically, 
with regard to independent directors, the MFW Chancery court 
explained: 
[A] structure [that requires the approval of the independent 
directors is one] where stockholders get the benefits of 
independent, empowered negotiating agents to bargain for 
the best price and say no if the agents believe the deal is not 
advisable for any proper reason, plus the critical ability to 
determine for themselves whether to accept any deal that 
their negotiating agents recommend to them.422 
In the MBO context, the assumption that independent 
directors will act in an informed manner, independent of 
managers, is even weaker than it is in a generic public company 
context.423 As Da Lin has documented empirically, director seats 
are a form of “controlling shareholder patronage,” which 
includes the prospect of future rewards as well as current 
 
say no definitively, and to select its own advisors, and (4) satisfied 
its requisite duty of care; and (5) the stockholders were fully 
informed and uncoerced. 
 420. See In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d at 501  
[I]t has to be clear that the procedural protections employed qualify 
to be given cleansing credit under the business judgment rule. For 
example, if the MFW special committee was not comprised of 
directors who qualify as independent under our law, the defendants 
would not be entitled to summary judgment under their own 
argument. 
 421. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 2013 WL 4009193, at *10 (discussing the 
standards set forth by the court in In re M & F Worldwide); see also Velikonja, 
supra note 83, at 882 (“Similarly, Delaware courts defer to outside directors’ 
judgment in ‘freeze-outs,’ where a controlling shareholder of a public company 
buys out minority shareholders, so long as the process they adopted appears 
appropriate.”). 
 422. In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d at 503 (emphasis added). 
 423. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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rewards, that can “systemic[ally]” influence the behavior of 
formally independent directors.424 
5.  Related-Party Transactions Under DGCL § 144 
Section 144 of the DGCL furnishes an analogous example 
of the board serving as a shield, via disinterested rather than 
independent directors.425 This provision establishes the criteria 
by which transactions between the corporation and certain 
classes of persons, including managers and directors, can be 
rendered non-voidable notwithstanding the fact that they 
constitute so-called interested or related-party transactions.426 
Purchases by the corporation of real estate, a company, or 
another asset owned by a director are examples of such 
transactions.427 A disinterested director is one who lacks an 
interest in the transaction.428 While Section 144 applies to 
disinterested rather than independent directors, like the above 
categories it deploys the judgment of directors who are 
ostensibly neutral as a substitute for external oversight. 
Section 144 identifies three ways for a contract with a 
covered party to remain valid, despite the conflict of interest: 
approval via a board process (the full board or a special 
committee approves it by a majority vote of disinterested 
directors); approval via a shareholder process (the shareholders 
approve it); and validation through a judicial process (the 
 
 424. Da Lin, supra note 100, at 518. 
 425. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144 (2020). 
 426. A fairly extensive literature exists on § 144 of the DGCL. Some 
commentators favor a broader read that attaches greater significance to a 
§ 144 approval, contending that it “protects a self-dealing transaction not only 
from invalidation but also from distinct, additional fairness review.” See Tuch, 
supra note 30, at 953 (distinguishing and explaining broad and narrow 
interpretations of § 144). 
 427. See id. at 941 (“[A]ny transaction between directors or officers and 
their corporation constitutes self-dealing . . . .”). 
 428. See Blake Rohrbacher et al., Finding Safe Harbor: Clarifying the 
Limited Application of Section 144, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 727 (2008) (“A 
director will generally be found to be ‘interested’⎯and thus not a ‘disinterested 
director’ under section 144(a)(1)⎯if he or she stands on both sides of the 
transaction or has a personal stake in the transaction that is not shared by 
stockholders generally.”). 
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transaction is later determined to be fair to the corporation).429 
None of these is sufficient on its own to activate the business 
judgment rule; however, any one of them will provide a safe 
harbor from a common law rule by which the transaction in 
question would have been rendered automatically void.430 
Specifically, the statute sets “a minimum requirement to retain 
the protection of the business judgment rule.”431 If the managers 
or directors wish to render the transaction eligible for business 
judgment shielding, the terms of Section 144(a)(1) allow them to 
secure the approval of an appropriate subset of disinterested 
directors.432 
* * * 
Management of the corporation is delegated to the board of 
directors by statute.433 The reason for this is straightforward: 
courts are not institutionally equipped to make garden-variety 
business decisions, and would lack legitimacy if they attempted 
to do so. Substituting their judgment for that of business 
entities on everyday business matters also runs afoul of market 
principles. By its terms, however, this standard account is 
limited to the wisdom of business decisions. It properly applies 
to questions implicating the duty of care, but Delaware courts 
rightly do not extend them automatically to decisions 
implicating the duty of loyalty. 
Yet despite the lack of any comparative advantage, the 
board’s power to shield is not limited to “care” judgments and 
extends to board decisions that require independent directors to 
weigh their abstract loyalty to the firm against the concrete 
material advantages that come with supporting its managers. 
 
 429. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144(a) (2020). 
 430. See Tuch, supra note 30, at 952−53 (explaining the operation of § 144). 
 431. HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 113 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
The provision does not conclusively determine whether business judgment or 
entire fairness applies, but as the court explains in HMG/Courtland, it does 
establish necessary conditions for the application of the more deferential 
business judgment rule. See Rohrbacher, supra note 428, at 735−36 
(discussing the court’s decision in HMG/Courtland). 
 432. HMG/Courtland, 749 A.2d at 114. 
 433. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
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Directors lack any obvious skill at determining if their CEO is 
acting in a self-interested way, for example—and there is reason 
to believe they may overlook such flaws, consciously or 
unconsciously.434 In 1993, Stephen Bainbridge argued that 
boards are nevertheless given the ability to cleanse conflicts of 
interest because they exercise final authority.435 Given the 
growing universe of decisions for which the independent board 
can be deployed as a shield, the normative case for maintaining 
this rule today is a harder one. 
V. A Shield from Market Discipline 
Shifts in market structure this century have supercharged 
managers’ ability to deploy the combination of the independent 
board and the business judgment rule as a shield not only 
against judicial review but against market discipline. 
Passive investment436 and shareholder activism437 have 
surged in terms of assets under management and broader 
market influence. Increasingly, outsiders to the corporation like 
mutual funds, institutional investors, activist shareholders, and 
proxy advisors invest resources in monitoring corporate 
 
 434. See supra Part III. 
 435. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1074−75 (“So long as the decisions 
are made by disinterested and independent directors, the net effect of the rules 
governing derivative litigation and the substantive standards is to preclude 
judicial review of the transaction.”). Bainbridge favors a highly deferential 
standard generally. See id. at 1074 (arguing that shareholders benefit more 
from a “centralized management structure” than from close judicial scrutiny, 
and that “[t]he power to review . . . is necessarily the power to decide”). 
 436. See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder 
Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 494 (2018) (“In the past few years, millions of 
investors have abandoned actively managed mutual funds . . . in favor of 
passively managed funds[.]”); Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 94 (“Passively 
managed funds increased from 1 percent of total fund assets in 1984 to 12.6 
percent in 2006 . . . .”); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs 
of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance 
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 884−85 (2013) (discussing increased 
investment through mutual funds). 
 437. See Shill, supra note 162, at 1254 (“Shareholder activism is surging. 
By the end of 2015, activist hedge funds had come to manage $120 billion in 
investor capital, double the figure from three years prior, and ten times the 
total from 2005.”). 
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governance matters.438 These sophisticated actors participate in 
a new “market for corporate influence,” and they “use the 
influence that accompanies their large ownership positions to 
discipline management.”439 They help curb “managerial slack, 
primarily because they identify underperforming firms as part 
of their investing strategy and are motivated to discipline 
wayward management.”440 But they have some 
well-documented limitations.441 
For example, mutual funds have a limited ability to monitor 
and discipline portfolio companies.442 The “Big Three” fund 
families, which have recently bulked up their governance ranks, 
have about one to two employees charged with monitoring every 
1,000 of their portfolio companies.443 It is difficult to imagine 
these ratios increasing to the point where funds can exercise 
effective discipline over all of their portfolio management teams. 
Activist hedge funds, which have an entirely different business 
model, nevertheless do not furnish much by way of 
counterexample: they deploy a large number of staffers per 
portfolio company, but invest in few companies.444 Pershing 
Square, for example, has an investment team of eight who, 
together with other staff, monitor twelve companies.445 Activist 
funds can be quite aggressive, so it is likely that their efforts 
 
 438. Activist hedge funds and mutual funds are both species of 
institutional investor, but operate differently. See Lund, supra note 436, at 
498 n.16 (explaining different types of institutional investors).  
 439. Id. at 494–95.  
 440. Id. at 495. 
 441. See, e.g., id. at 493 (arguing that passive funds lack appropriate 
incentives to ensure companies are well run and face collective action 
problems); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 100 (same); Gilson &  
Gordon, supra note 176, at 863 (noting agency costs in institutional 
investment reflecting a gap in the interests of beneficial owners and the 
institutional investors who manage their assets). 
 442. See infra note 443 and accompanying text. 
 443. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 100 (“Vanguard employs about 
15 staff for voting and stewardship at its 13,000 portfolio companies; 
BlackRock employs 24 staff for voting and stewardship at 14,000 portfolio 
companies; and State Street Global Advisors employs fewer than 10 staff for 
voting and stewardship at 9,000 portfolio companies.”). 
 444. See infra note 445 and accompanying text. 
 445. Lund, supra note 436, at 516 n.112. 
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generate some in terrorem effect on companies outside their 
portfolio. Even this dynamic, though, focuses boards on highly 
visible weaknesses in their governance. In the market’s view, 
insufficient independentness is a prominent example of such a 
weakness. 
In all, the population of companies whose stock trades on 
the major U.S. stock exchanges numbers in the thousands.446 
The corporate governance of many flies under the radar of the 
limited teams monitoring them. Even proxy advisory firms like 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, 
whose business is to advise investors on companies’ corporate 
governance, operate in an environment of scarce resources447 
and intensifying regulatory pressure, including new regulations 
of the industry from the SEC.448 
Managers are well positioned to capture rents from these 
inefficiencies. With Big Three funds assigning small teams to 
monitor 9,000 to 14,000 portfolio companies,449 the growing 
focus on corporate governance has created an information 
assimilation challenge. It expanded the market for information 
about governance without a way to effectively manage it. After 
all, firms are constantly advised that “[o]utside directors can 
bring expertise and independence to the board, which can 
 
 446. Shares of approximately 6,500 companies are traded on the New York 
Stock Exchange and Nasdaq combined; stock of a further 339 companies are 
traded on NYSE American (formerly the American Stock Exchange). See 
Company List (NASDAQ, NYSE, & AMEX), NASDAQ, https://perma.cc/XJ9D-
8S6E. 
 447. Their impact is often overstated. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & 
Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 
869, 869–71 (2010) (estimating on the basis of empirical evidence that 
industry leader Institutional Shareholder Services shifts 6–10 percent of 
shareholder ballots, and characterizing the firm’s primary influence as that of 
an information aggregator). 
 448. See David Bell et al., SEC Tightens Regulations on Proxy Advisory 
Firms, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 18, 2020),  
https://perma.cc/TLZ9-PBN5; Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy 
Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89372, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,082 (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Supplement to Commission Guidance Regarding 
Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 5547 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276).  
 449. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.  
Shill.ICErecon (Do Not Delete) 1/15/2021  5:06 PM 
THE INDEPENDENT BOARD AS SHIELD 1893 
 
reduce agency costs and improve firm performance.”450 But how 
do firms prioritize? How do they avoid the crosshairs of an 
activist or proxy advisor,451 which could in turn stimulate 
interest at a mutual fund that could tip a director election? 
While complicated in principle, in practice staying in the 
good graces of corporate governance opinion leaders (proxy 
advisors and others) is straightforward. A version of this 
phenomenon began decades ago with federal requirements that 
mutual funds engage in informed voting, which in turn created 
demand for proxy advice and thus firms specializing in it.452 ISS, 
Glass Lewis, and other proxy advisors prepare research and 
report cards on companies’ governance structures to advise 
funds and other investors on voting their shares, and to advise 
companies on their own and one another’s exposure.453 Given an 
extraordinary volume of information and a need to facilitate 
comparisons, these materials tend to stress features of 
governance that can be readily standardized across public 
companies, and about which information is publicly disclosed 
and easy to ascertain. 
Corporate governance by check box has attracted 
considerable criticism, but in a universe of scarce monitoring 
resources it is natural for market interest to coalesce around 
standardized, comparable metrics. ISS’ voting guidelines are 
organized into seven categories.454 The range of topics they 
touch is vast, but the level of board independence rates highly.455 
ISS recommends avoiding overboarding (director membership 
 
 450.  DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, INDEPENDENT AND OUTSIDE 
DIRECTORS 15 (2015), https://perma.cc/K2QV-8KTP (PDF). 
 451.  Arguably, the new SEC rule pertaining to proxy advisors makes it 
easier to avoid pressure from them. See Bell et al., supra note 448. 
 452. See Lund, supra note 436, at 517 (discussing how voting guidelines 
are influenced by proxy advisors like ISS and Glass Lewis).  
 453. See generally ISS Governance, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 
https://perma.cc/UTL3-WYQB; Glass Lewis: Company Overview, GLASS LEWIS, 
https://perma.cc/3HQC-GSNL.  
 454. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING 
GUIDELINES BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 2–6 (2019) https://
perma.cc/7JZT-LUQ9 (PDF) (listing categories); see also id. at 5–6 (listing an 
eighth category for mutual fund proxies).  
 455. See id. at 8 (listing independence as the first fundamental principle 
to apply when voting on the board of directors). 
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on an excessive number of boards), separating the roles of board 
chair and CEO, facilitating shareholder access to the proxy, and 
other highly visible, highly salient features of governance that 
are nevertheless relatively low cost to implement.456 Pension 
funds similarly adopt guidelines that emphasize 
independence.457 Investment banks, law firms, accounting 
firms, and other market intermediaries echo this message. 
Since independentness currently codes as a quality favoring 
shareholders, enhancing the officially independent character of 
a board (under flawed definitions) is a cheap signal by managers 
that they are prioritizing that goal. Boards can obtain favorable 
voting recommendations from ISS and Glass Lewis—and thus 
avoid the spotlight—by following their guidance, thus virtually 
guaranteeing the reelection of their directors. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, directors are reelected.458 
The above dynamics have created a market for corporate 
governance information and influence that prizes independence. 
Just as in other markets, market actors can minimize scrutiny 
by complying with expectations. What is somewhat unusual in 
the case of corporate governance, however, is the focus on the 
level of board independence. This focus both reflects and 
intensifies the parallel emphasis on independent directors in 
Delaware law. Filtered through the limitations of the 
independent board459 and the power of the business judgment 
rule,460 it enables managers to place important aspects of their 
conduct—including decisions that create the potential for 
self-dealing—beyond the reach of market discipline. 
 
 456. See id. at 7–11, 19–20 (giving guidelines on the composition and 
independence of boards and shareholder proxy access). 
 457. For example, the voting guidelines of CalPERS, the California public 
employees’ pension fund and one of the largest such funds, as of 2016 imposed 
an elevated disclosure expectation of companies with regard to independence. 
They asked companies to explain why any directors serving in excess of twelve 
years should still be considered independent. CA. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 20 (Mar. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/5C36-CN8E 
(PDF). 
 458. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Bad Directors and Why They Aren’t 
Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/T7XV-H8CU (noting 
that over 99 percent of directors were reelected in 2012). 
 459. See supra Part III. 
 460. See supra Part IV. 
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VI.  Courts, Not Boards, Should Adjudicate Conflicts 
Too much of modern corporate governance depends on the 
presumed virtues of outside independent directors. Such 
directors are increasingly called upon to clear transactions that 
create actual or penumbral conflicts of interest for them—and 
changes in market structure461 since the rise of the independent 
model make this error more consequential than before. 
Managers exert tremendous influence over independent 
directors’ status on the board, their pay, whether they are 
considered for future board and executive opportunities, and 
their ability to learn information about the firm and the 
managers they are charged with supervising.462 Delaware 
courts are hardly unaware of this issue;463 indeed, they have 
identified each of these as a problem.464 In Unocal, for example, 
the court warned of the “omnipresent specter that a board may 
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the 
corporation and its shareholders.”465 Yet in negotiating this 
tension, Delaware courts have settled on processes466 that all 
hang on the same thin reed: the judgment of an independent 
board that has often been captured by managers and converted 
to a shield.467 
In view of the combined danger posed by the independent 
board and the business judgment rule, this Part urges an end to 
business judgment deference in transactions implicating the 
duty of loyalty and a return to robust judicial review via the 
entire fairness standard. In the alternative, it proposes an 
expansion of shareholder voting. 
 
 461. See supra Part V. 
 462. See supra Part III. 
 463. See, e.g., supra Parts III–IV. 
 464. See supra Parts III–IV; In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 
917, 938–43 (Del. Ch. 2003) (commenting on various types of biasing ties). 
 465. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 466. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 509 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(articulating a standard that “the director in question’s material ties to the 
person whose proposal or actions she is evaluating [must not be] sufficiently 
substantial that she cannot objectively fulfill her fiduciary duties”). 
 467. See, e.g., supra Parts II–V. 
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The best way to address the shield problem is by subjecting 
transactions with high self-dealing potential to review for entire 
fairness.468 This standard calls for “judicial scrutiny of the 
substance of business transactions for objective fairness of both 
price and process.”469 It is the standard of review that Delaware 
courts apply when a transaction fails to receive business 
judgment deference.470 If the possibility of business judgment 
review is removed, entire fairness becomes the logical, 
appropriate vehicle for assessing transactions that are currently 
shielded. When litigated, the decision by a company like Disney, 
for example, to enter into an agreement to pay $130 million in 
severance to a former CEO who was only briefly associated with 
the firm would be reviewed to determine whether it was entirely 
fair to the corporation and its shareholders. 
Pressures on independent directors that Delaware courts 
(and stock exchanges) have spent decades dancing around471 
should, under Delaware law at a minimum, be considered 
conflicts of interest that render board decisions on conflict 
transactions ineligible for business judgment immunity. Unlike 
in ordinary business matters,472 boards have no comparative 
advantage in deciding such questions. Courts—neutral 
decisionmakers who, especially in Delaware, are regularly 
called upon to adjudicate matters of equity—are a more 
desirable institution in which to vest such authority. Judge 
Easterbrook has emphasized this distinction. While we “praise” 
measures that align managers’ incentives with those of 
shareholders, he observed, the notion of incentivizing judges 
with money is anathema to judging: “If a judge should bet on the 
 
 468. Today, once approved by the independent board, review of such 
transactions is essentially limited to waste. See In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73–74 (Del. 2006) (noting that appellants’ waste 
claim is “rooted in the doctrine that a plaintiff who fails to rebut the business 
judgment rule presumptions is not entitled to any remedy unless the 
transaction constitutes waste”). 
 469. Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 170. 
 470. See id. at 169–70 (discussing when the business judgment rule is 
applied compared to the entire fairness standard). 
 471. See supra Parts II–IV. 
 472. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 140–41 (discussing greater legitimacy, 
expertise, and proactive capacity of boards to manage corporations, relative to 
courts). 
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astuteness of his business judgments by holding stock in the 
firms that appeared before him, we would hustle the judge off to 
jail.”473 Unlike generic business decisions that do not pose 
conflicts, decisions that present the prospect of self-dealing 
should be reviewable by judges and not only by those who stand 
to gain from the self-dealing. As Judge Easterbrook says, 
“[s]elf-interest is a powerful spur.”474 
It will be objected that companies are simply compelled by 
the market to guarantee large sums of money to prospective 
CEOs if they are to lure top talent (indeed, the Disney court 
seemed to think this was plausible).475 Even if true today, this 
position excludes the possibility of dynamic reactions to change. 
If such packages were to come under more intense judicial and 
shareholder scrutiny, they would be required to meet elevated 
standards of fairness to the corporation. Boards would likely 
respond with fairer terms and greater transparency, both of 
which would be desirable. The risk that this new equilibrium 
would fail to produce an adequate quantity of qualified CEOs 
seems low. 
Restoring entire fairness review would also place the 
determination of a legal question—whether a transaction 
constitutes self-dealing—into the appropriate hands: those of 
judges. Judges are uniquely well positioned to adjudicate 
conflicts of interest as a matter of competence and institutional 
role. Not only do they have deep experience in the area, they 
have taken an oath to pursue justice and fairness without 
partiality. 
Even if imperfectly realized, the ideal of the judge and the 
institution of the judiciary is one of fairness. The four canons of 
the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct command 
judicial neutrality by mandating “integrity,” “independence,” 
“impartiality,” and the absence of judicial conflicts of interest.476 
 
 473. Easterbrook, supra note 320, at 984. 
 474. See id. (explaining his support for pay-for-performance in executive 
compensation). 
 475. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 476. DEL. JUD. ETHICS ADVISORY COMM., DELAWARE JUDGES’ CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 9–20 (2008), https://perma.cc/QUA3-QE2S (PDF).  
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The canons of the federal counterpart are similar.477 Corporate 
directors and managers, by contrast, are not valorized for 
fairness but for other qualities. They pursue shareholder wealth 
maximization. More specifically, self-dealing in the gray zones 
detailed in this Article does not run afoul of the legal constraints 
they currently operate under because any infirmities can be 
eliminated by independent directors.478 And even when 
operating diligently and in good faith, they face structural, 
behavioral, and financial headwinds and incentives that 
compromise their ability to fairly adjudicate conflicts. 479 
It will also be objected that entire fairness will ensure more 
litigation. This is likely correct. In recent years, many reforms 
have been proposed to reduce shareholder litigation, and some 
have been adopted. There may be room for a 
welfare-maximizing change that simultaneously dials up the 
scrutiny of decisions currently shielded while dialing down 
other channels. In re Trulia, which limits the availability of 
disclosure-only settlements that do not make shareholders 
whole, may provide a model.480 Inevitably, however, some 
certainty would be lost if the proposed shift is adopted. But the 
powerful shield furnished by current law allocates the benefit of 
that certainty almost wholly to managers, at great cost to 
shareholders and other stakeholders. This is hard to square 
with the principles underlying either the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty or shareholder wealth maximization (to say nothing of 
other theories of corporate purpose). 
Recommended fixes to date that propose targeting the 
independence channel alone would be helpful but are 
insufficient. Yaron Nili, for example, suggests more robust 
disclosure of independents’ potential conflicts of interest.481 
Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani suggest the creation of 
“enhanced-independence” directors who would play a key role in 
 
 477. See generally Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CTS., 
https://perma.cc/ZG6J-UKKT (Mar. 12, 2019). 
 478. See supra Part IV. 
 479. See supra Part III. 
 480. See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 897–99 (Del. Ch. 
2016). 
 481. Nili, supra note 116, at 70–72. 
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cleansing conflict transactions in controlled companies.482 These 
solutions build broadly on enhancements to the independent 
board proposed a generation earlier by Ronald Gilson and 
Reinier Kraakman.483 However, their common limitation is the 
expectation that independent directors can productively serve 
as a cleansing device for a wide range of conflict transactions. 
When independent directors decide on transactions of great 
personal interest to managers, such as CEO pay, they are 
inherently conflicted. This is not the kind of problem for which 
an internal solution, like disclosure, is a practical remedy. Other 
scholars, such as Lisa Fairfax, have counseled more structural 
solutions, for example a revival of governance by inside 
directors, though she has acknowledged the case is an “uneasy” 
one and has also called for more “rigorous review” by courts.484 
A next-best solution would be to condition business 
judgment deference on shareholder ratification. Boards could 
have the option to submit decisions concerning CEO pay, poison 
pills blocking tender offers that shareholders would support, 
derivative lawsuits, and other matters implicating independent 
directors’ interests to shareholders for express approval at an 
annual or special shareholder meeting. Delaware law already 
requires boards to submit many bet-the-company corporate 
decisions485  and quasi-constitutional changes486 to shareholder 
 
 482. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 170, at 1290 
(“Enhanced-independence directors should play an active role when a conflict 
arises between the interests of the controller and those of public investors.”).  
 483. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 170, at 883 (recommending “the 
introduction of outside directors to actively monitor public corporations in the 
shareholders’ interest.”).  
 484. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 186.  
 485. The most prominent example concerns decisions that could 
conceivably transform or destroy the corporation before the next meeting. See, 
e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(c) (2020) (merger requires approval of target’s 
shareholders); id. § 271 (sale of substantially all the corporation’s assets 
requires shareholder approval); id. § 275 (dissolution requires shareholder 
approval). 
 486. These include amendments to the corporation’s articles of 
incorporation (DGCL § 242(b)(1)), changes to the bylaws (DGCL § 109(a)), the 
exculpation of directors or officers (DGCL § 102(b)(7)), authorizations of 
additional shares (DGCL § 242(a)(3)), and the election and removal of directors 
(DGCL § 141(k)), among other changes. 
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votes, and stock exchange rules487 and federal law488 further 
require shareholder approvals for executive compensation and 
other matters of special shareholder salience. This would be a 
modest extension, amply precedented.489 Some of these votes 
would replicate ones, such as on executive compensation,490 that 
are already mandatory under stock exchange or federal rules. 
However, if business judgment immunity were conditioned on 
favorable outcomes one would expect these votes to better reflect 
shareholder wishes. At the moment, federally mandated 
shareholder votes on executive pay are advisory and lack any 
legal effect.491 
As a practical matter, this solution would likely trigger 
litigation over whether the stockholder vote was fully informed. 
The Delaware Supreme Court held in Corwin v. KKR Financial 
Holdings492 that a fully informed vote of disinterested, 
uncoerced public shareholders forecloses claims of fiduciary 
duty breach—essentially, that it operates as a 
 
 487. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.08 Shareholder Approval of 
Equity Compensation Plans, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/585T-9NC4 
(requiring shareholder approval of equity compensation plans). 
 488. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.422–3 (2020) (requiring shareholder approval 
of equity compensation plans). 
 489. For example, courts already consider board decisions regarding 
independent director compensation to implicate self-interest, and thus 
condition business judgment treatment on an informed, approving vote of 
shareholders. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1211 
(Del. 2017) (holding that upon submission by the board of “specific [i.e., 
non-discretionary] compensation decisions for approval by fully informed, 
uncoerced, and disinterested stockholders, ratification [by shareholders] is 
properly asserted as a defense in support of a motion to dismiss” and thus 
business judgment immunity available). The MBO and related-party 
transaction contexts provide further precedent. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide 
Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642–54 (Del. 2014) (detailing MBO procedure); DEL CODE 
tit. 8 § 144(a)(2) (2020) (addressing submissions of related-party transactions 
to shareholders); supra Part IV.C. 
 490. See, e.g., supra notes 487–488 and accompanying text.  
 491. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–21 (setting forth procedures for shareholder 
consideration of executive compensation). 
 492. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). For an argument that Corwin does not 
amount to a reversal of shareholder protections, see generally Matteo Gatti, 
Did Delaware Really Kill Corporate Law? Shareholder Protection in a 
Post-Corwin World, 16 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 345 (2020). 
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shareholder-approved shield.493 Since that time, litigation has 
shifted away from the question of breach to the question of 
whether the shareholder vote was adequately informed.494 If 
adopted, this change would likely provoke a similar shift, which 
should lower the expected value of this already modest change. 
The shareholder ratification model, increasingly popular in 
Delaware,495 also equates the approval of shareholders with 
permission to engage in transactions that verge on self-dealing. 
However, since it is an appropriation of their own assets that 
the conduct they are voting on potentially authorizes, this is not 
as objectionable as it may seem. An analogy would be allowing 
crime victims to negate the prosecution of those accused of 
victimizing them, a practice that prosecutors de facto permit in 
some cases even as it substitutes a private interest for the public 
interest. But there is some evidence to suggest the value of 
shareholder approval is significantly overstated and thus 
Delaware’s “obsession with the shareholder vote” misplaced.496 
To be clear, this alternative suggestion is much less desirable 
than the primary reform advocated by this Article, but it is also 
more consonant with prevailing trends in Delaware law. 
The better reform would be to make the broader category of 
self-dealing transactions this Article introduces497 subject to 
judicial review for entire fairness. However, either change 
proposed here would address a longstanding mistake: the 
expectation that an “independent” board that is indebted to 
managers and has the power both to make corporate policy 
 
 493. See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 311–14 (holding that all facts regarding the 
board’s interests, KKR’s interests, and the negotiation process, were fully 
disclosed).  
 494. See Edward B. Micheletti et al., Corwin, MFW and Beyond: 
Developing Trends in Delaware Disclosure Law, SKADDEN INSIGHTS (Nov. 19, 
2019), https://perma.cc/FTL2-F4X7 (discussing how courts in recent cases 
focus on whether shareholder votes were fully informed). 
 495. See James D. Cox et al., Understanding the (Ir)relevance of 
Shareholder Votes on M&A Deals, 69 DUKE L.J. 503, 528 (2019) (discussing 
how various factors caused Delaware courts to “put shareholder ratification 
on a pedestal”).  
 496. See id. at 504 (contending that trades by merger arbitrageurs on the 
eve of a deal have “a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
likelihood of merger deals garnering the required shareholder approval”). 
 497. See supra Part IV. 
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decisions that enrich managers and to shield them from review 
would reliably resist that temptation. 
VII.  Conclusion 
While proponents and skeptics of shareholder power 
disagree on the effectiveness of the central institution of modern 
corporate governance—the independent board—both groups 
assume that it protects shareholders from opportunistic and 
predatory managers.498 The legal requirements of 
“independence,” however, set forth a standard that is very 
forgiving of potential conflicts of interest, and many reasons 
exist to believe directors are frequently incapable of overcoming 
those conflicts. Thus, once an independent board is seated and 
other procedural minima are satisfied, managers can use the 
board to shield self-interested transactions through the 
business judgment rule.499 In short, the independent board’s 
vision has been captured by the very cohort—managers—it was 
designed to constrain.500 This paradox applies not only in the 
realm of law, but in the capital markets, where changes in 
market structure enable the independent board to frustrate 
both traditional and emerging mechanisms of market 
discipline.501 
Previous proposals that advocate tweaks to the 
independence standard are unlikely to alter this dynamic.502 
Fortunately, Delaware law already provides good alternatives 
for managing conflict transactions.503 The best choice is to 
simply submit such decisions to judges for review under the 
well-established entire fairness standard. Doing so would end 
the dubious use of the independent board as a vehicle for 
shielding corporate conduct from shareholders, courts, and 
markets. It would also constitute a step towards addressing the 
larger problem of which misplaced faith in the independent 
 
 498. See supra Parts I–II.  
 499. See supra Part IV. 
 500. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 501. See supra Part V.  
 502. See supra Parts III–VI. 
 503. See supra Part VI.  
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board is a symptom: the pervasive use in corporate and 
securities law of self-regulation as a substitute for traditional 
safeguards, like judicial review. 
 
